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Polycarpe: Examining the Right to Premortem Cryopreservation

NOTE
EXAMINING THE RIGHT TO
PREMORTEM CRYOPRESERVATION

IN MEMORY OF PROFESSOR DWIGHT L. GREENE
Goodbye My Educator
The Stone halls of Hofstra shall bereave
the loss of your sprightly steps.
No longer will we hear your laughter,
No longer will we be warmed by the generosity of your smile.
Swiftly forthcoming, one and all received its grace.
Such heartening refuge in a world coldly filled
with rapacious men and women.
You have kindled our thirst for knowledge.
You have kindled our thirst for justice.
Yet what justice has been served by
such a cruel and unlikely end?
Forever lost are the jurisprudential lessons.
Forever remain the moments we have shared with you,
In our Hearts, in our Minds, in all you have Touched,
Through your Work, through your Life, through your Love for All.
Goodbye My Educator.
Vivianne Calizaire
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INTRODUCTION

Death, be not proud, though some have called thee

Mighty and dreadful, for thou art not so;
For those whom thou think'st thou dost overthrow
Die not, poor death, nor yet canst thou kill me.
From rest and sleep, which but thy pictures be,
Much pleasure; then from thee much more must flow,
And soonest our best men with thee do go,
Rest of their bones, and soul's delivery.
Thou art slave to fate, chance, kings, and desperate men,
And dost with poison, war, and sickness dwell,
And poppy or charms can make us sleep as well
And better than thy stroke; why swell'st thou then?
One short sleep past, we wake eternally
And death shall be no more; Death, thou shalt die.'
The single characteristic common to all living things is that
eventually they die. From the simplest microorganism to the most
complex form of life, the cessation of all life functions occurs sooner
or later. Homo sapiens, arguably the most complex biological units to
have evolved from the primordial soup, are no exception. However,
cryobiology, the study of biological systems at very low temperature,
has led many to believe that death may be delayed if a subject is
properly cryopreserved.2
As currently practiced, cryopreservation of a subject takes place

1. John Donne, Holy Sonnets, in I THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1097, 1099 (M.H. Abrams et al. eds., 5th ed. 1986). Priests, preachers, poets, and
playwrights have written and spoken volumes about death and our inability to avoid it. See,
e.g., Robert Browning, Prospice, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE
1301, 1301-02 (M.H. Abrams et al. eds., 5th ed. 1986). However, there are those, like John
Donne, who do not believe that death is as powerful as it has been portrayed. In light of the
technological advances of today, John Donne, who wrote Biathanatos, an unpublished treatise
on the lawfulness of suicide, 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1061
(M.H. Abrams et al. eds., 5th ed. 1986), would probably include cryopreservation as one of
the masters of death: One cold night past, we wake eternally. And death shall be no more.
2. See, e.g., CURRENT TRENDS IN CRYOBIOLOGY (Audrey U. Smith ed., 1970); GEORGE
P. SMITH, II, MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRYONICS: PROSPECTS FOR IMMORTALITY 1-2
(1983).
3. Different terminologies for the procedure are used interchangeably. For example,
some use "cryogenic suspension" to refer to the freezing, storage, and long-term maintenance
of the patient. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (CL App. 1992).
Others use "cryonics" to refer to the entire procedure. See generally BRIAN WOWK & MI-
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soon after the subject is declared clinically dead4 with the hope of

CHAEL DARWIN, CRYoNics: REACHING FOR TOMORROW (1991). This Note uses the term
"cryopreservation" to refer to the entire procedure.
Although the procedure for the freezing process has been refined considerably over the
years, the general steps remain constant:
a.
Upon clinical death, the patient is cooled externally while circulation and
breathing are artificially restored. This step keeps the blood flowing and prevents
additional damage to the cells. SMITH, supra note 2, at 12 n.25.
b.
The patient is injected with a measured dose of heparin or some other
anticoagulant to prevent coagulation of the blood. Id.
C.
Noradrenalin is injected to raise the blood pressure. Noradrenalin is a vasoconstrictor which raises blood pressure by causing the musculature of arteries to
contract. Id.
d.
A dosage of an antibiotic is also administered to decrease the population of
intestinal bacteria; sodium bicarbonate is also injected to offset acidosis. Id.
e.
When the body temperature reaches 10' C, the entire blood volume is
flushed out of the body and replaced with a cryoprotectant. The most effective
cryoprotectant used today is a solution of dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) with sodium
chloride, disodium glycerophosphate, and dextrose. An adjustment to a pH of 7.4
should be made to the body's fluids. Id.
The cryoprotectant is necessary to the procedure because of the damage that
ice formation can cause to the cells. The body contains a large amount of water.
The cytoplasm of every cell, as well as the extracellular fluid, is filled with water.
As the extracellular water freezes, the extracellular concentration of electrolytes and
other dissolved materials increases. The increase in concentration causes water to
travel from the intracellular fluid to the extracellular fluid to equilibrate the extracellular and intracellular concentrations. However, this is futile because as long as
the temperature keeps decreasing, the extracellular water will continue to crystallize,
thereby repeating the cycle. Cell damage occurs as the intracellular water is withdrawn and the cell collapses. See WOWK & DARWIN, supra, at 11.
The cryoprotectant, insofar as it is permeable to the cellular membrane,
enters the cell and binds the intracellular water. Water in the extracellular fluid is
also bound by the cryoprotectant. The intended result is to prevent or reduce the
instances of water crystallization. The toxicity of the chemicals to the cell should
also be considered in choosing a suitable cryoprotectant. See Locksley E. McGann
& Michele L. Walterson, Cryoprotection by Dimethyl Sulfoxide and Dimethyl Sulfone, 24 CRYOBIOLOGY 11 (1987) (discussing the general need for cryoprotectants
in the preservation of cells and tissues at low temperatures, and the membrane
permeability and toxicity criteria in selecting appropriate cryoprotective compounds).
f.
The subject is now ready to be cooled further. The temperature is lowered
by increments. Storage of the subject is done at -196"C. SMITH, supra note 2, at
12 n.25; see also Lucy KAVALER, FREEZING POINT: COLD AS A MATrER OF LIFE
AND DEATH 249 (1970).
4. While cessation of gross anatomical functions, such as heartbeat and breathing, may
signal that the ultimate end, namely, cellular death, is imminent, an intermediate level of
activities must be conquered before cellular death actually occurs. Several biological activities
still continue for a significant amount of time even after clinical death. SMrrH. supra note 2,
at 25. The cessation of these activities some time after clinical death is defined as biological
death. Id. Cellular death, on the other hand, is the irreversible disorganization of individual
body cells. See WOWK & DARWIN, supra note 3, at 8.
The general premise of cryopreservation is that gross anatomical activities such as
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reviving the person at some time in the future. One of the goals of
cryobiology, however, is to preserve terminally ill patients before the
onset of clinical death, or "premortem."5 If the technology is perfected to the level predicted by cryobiologists, it will raise a plethora of
sociological, political, philosophical, religious, and legal issues. The
concepts of life and death are at the very core of those issues. Our
legal definitions of death,6 homicide,7 assisted suicide,8 and the right
to refuse medical treatment will require re-examination.
After the Supreme Court's recent acknowledgement of the right
to refuse medical treatment,9 the debate over whether similar recognition should be extended to physician-assisted suicide and premortem
cryopreservation has intensified. Several events have contributed to
the debate. For example, Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who has helped several
patients to commit suicide, has brought the idea of physician-assisted
suicide off the pages of scholarly articles and into the free market of
ideas and the courtroom." Other stories continue to surface and fuel

heartbeat and respiration can be restored, if the onset of biological death and everything
thereafter is forestalled. Id. at 8-9. Insofar as respiration, heartbeat, and brain activity are
derivative of biological activities, which themselves are the results of cellular activities, forestalling biological death and cellular death through the freezing process should, in theory,
allow for the reestablishment of gross anatomical functions. Id. Thus. where biological and
cellular activities remain viable, clinical death is theoretically reversible. See id.
5. See Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60-61 (involving a patient who wanted to be
cryopreserved before his inoperable brain tumor completely destroyed his brain).
6. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 386 (West Supp. 1993).
7. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1 - 210.4 (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes
1962).
8. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
9. See Cruzan v. Director. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 61 (Ct. App. 1992); see
also Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 2021 (1992) (proposing an analytical framework for allowing physician-assisted suicide).
11. On June 4, 1990, Dr. Jack Kevorkian assisted Janet Adkins, a 54-year old sufferer
of Alzheimer's disease, in committing suicide by using a machine that Dr. Kevorkian had
designed and built. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Kevorkian. No. 90-390963-AZ (Cir. CL
Oakland Cty., Mich., Feb. 5, 1991), reprinted in 7 IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 107, 108 (1991).
The machine consisted of three vials containing three different solutions. An electric motor
which the patient activated by pressing a button controlled the intravenous release of the
solutions into the patient's body. The first solution released, saline, was harmless; however,
the next solution, thiopental, caused unconsciousness. The final solution, potassium chloride,
caused cardiac arrest. Id. at 108. Soon thereafter, the Circuit Court for the County of Oakland issued a preliminary injunction providing that:
Defendant Kevorkian . . . shall be and hereby [is] enjoined pending final disposition of this cause from: using, employing, administering, offering, or providing any
of his "suicide machines," . . . on, or to, any person seeking to end a human life,
or conducting any acts to help a patient commit suicide regardless of the modality
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the fire. In 1991, Dr. Timothy E. Quill, a member of the faculty of
the University of Rochester Medical School, revealed that he had
helped a leukemia patient to commit suicide. 2

Similarly, cryopreservation is no longer a subject for science
employed.
Id. at 107. On February 5, 1991, the court transformed the temporary injunction into a
permanent one. Id. at 121. Circuit Judge Alice L. Gilbert conclusively stated that "[alt the
present time, patient self-determination does not encompass self-extermination effectuated by a
physician." Id. at 120. While admitting that there are situations "under which life exceeds the
level of physical and/or emotional tolerance where, in fact, the alternative to life serves the
best interest of a patient[,]" Judge Gilbert concluded that "[p]atients cannot confer a right
upon a doctor to assist a suicide . . . [or] dictate to a physician how to practice medicine."
Id. at 118.
Dr. Kevorkian was also charged with first degree murder, pursuant to MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 1980). The charges were ultimately dropped because "there was
no proof that [Dr. Kevorkian] had planned and carried out the death of . . .Jane Adkins"
See William E. Schmidt, Prosecutors Drop Criminal Case Against Doctor Involved in Suicide,
N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 15, 1990, at A10. As a result of the dismissal of the murder charge,
Michigan State Senator Frederick Dillingham proposed a bill that criminalizes assisting suicide. The bill was passed and became effective on March 31, 1993. See MIcH. COMP. LAW
§ 752.1027 (1992). The statute made assisting suicide a felony punishable by either a fouryear prison term or a $2,000 fine. Id.
12. Timothy E. Quill, Death And Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making,
324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991) [hereinafter Death And Dignity]; see Lawrence K.
Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMEs, July
27, 1991, at Al.
Dr. Quill revealed his story in a recent issue of The New England Journal of Medicine. The patient involved, simply called Diane, had successfully overcome several hurdles in
her life, including vaginal cancer and alcoholism, before she was diagnosed with acute
myelomonocytic leukemia. Death And Dignity, supra, at 692.
The patient, upon her diagnosis, had apparently decided to forego technological interventions and long-term cures that had a proven success rate of 25%. Id. However, some time
later, she informed Dr. Quill that "[wihen the time came, she wanted to take her life in the
least painful way possible." Id. at 693. She was afraid of a lingering death that would interfere with her desire to get the most out of the time she had left. Id. Mindful of that possibility and of the effect that a violent death or an unsuccessful suicide attempt would have on
Diane's family, Dr. Quill acquiesced to her request for barbiturates. Id. With a readily available means to commit suicide, the patient was free to live fully and concentrate on enhancing
the quality of the relationships she had with her friends and family. See id.
As per her agreement with Dr. Quill, the two met several times over the next several
months. Then, two days after a meeting during which she informed Dr. Quill that she would
be leaving soon, her husband called to inform him that she had died. Id. She had the opportunity to say goodbye to her friends, husband, and son and was finally at peace. Id. Dr.
Quill reported the patient's cause of death as "acute leukemia"; however, he concedes that
"[allthough [he] did not assist in her suicide directly, [he] helped indirectly to make it possible, successful, and relatively painless:' Id. at 694.
Dr. Quill's revelation contributed to the debate over physician-assisted suicide in a
positive way. Ultimately, a grand jury in Rochester declined to indict Dr. Quill. See Altman,
supra, at Al. It found "no criminal liability on the part of Dr. Quill in connection with the
death of his patient, Diane:' Id. at A10.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:1385

fiction. The issue was recently addressed by the California Court of
Appeal in Donaldson v. Van de Kamp." Petitioner Thomas
Donaldson, suffering from a malignant brain tumor, brought an action

for a declaration that he "has a constitutional right to premortem
cryogenic suspension of his body and the assistance of others in
achieving that state."' 4 Donaldson also sought to enjoin any criminal
prosecution of those who agreed to assist him in achieving cryogenic
suspension."
Part IHof this Note argues that, given our current acceptance of
the right to refuse treatment and the common law right to self-determination, premortem cryopreservation of a competent, terminally ill
person should be constitutionally protected as an exercise of that
person's right to self-determination. Part III proposes an amendment
to the current statutes against aiding and abetting suicide that would
immunize from criminal prosecution scientists who assist in the
premortem cryopreservation of competent, terminally ill patients. The
amendment would require that premortem cryopreservation be subject
to the same balancing test as the right to refuse medical treatment.
HI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
PREMORTEM CRYOPRESERVATION

It has been several decades since the United States Supreme
Court established the right to privacy as a fundamental right deserving of constitutional protection. 6 Several commentators have identified Griswold v. Connecticut7 as the case to first announce the constitutional right to privacy. In actuality, in the context of procre-

13. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1992).
14. Id. at 60.
15. Id.

16. Since that time, the United States Supreme Court has heard several cases founded
on the various rights within the penumbra of the right to privacy. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986) (the right to homosexual sodomy); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (the fundamental right to privacy in a
prisoner's cell); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the right of a woman to have an abortion).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining The "Right To Die," 77 KY. LJ. 319, 339 (1989); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Priva-

cy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 744 n.44 (1989); Martha A. Matthews, Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right To Refuse Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CAL. L. REv. 707, 722
n.120 (1987); Stephanie C. Powell, Comment, Constitutional Law-Forced Feeding of a Prisoner on a Hunger Strike: A Violation of an Inmate's Right to Privacy, 61 N.C. L. REv. 714,

717 (1983).
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ation, the Supreme Court intimated the existence of such a right in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 9 more than two decades before Griswold was
decided; but in Skinner, the Court simply called it a basic liberty
interest.2" Several other rights have since been located under the umbrella of a basic liberty interest.2'
It must be noted, however, that although one of the stated purposes of the Constitution is to secure our individual liberty,' unconditional protection of the entire spectrum of individual liberty is not
reasonable in an ordered society. 3 The core notion of liberty is that

19. 316 U.S. 535. 541 (1942).
20. Skinner involved Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 57, §§ 171-195 (West 1991). The Act provided for the sterilization of any person who
had been convicted more than once of felonies of "moral turpitude." Skinner, 316 U.S. at
536. Petitioner, who had been convicted of stealing chickens and armed robbery, challenged
the constitutionality of the Act when the Attorney General instituted proceedings against him.
Id. at 536-37. The petitioner was to be sterilized by vasectomy.
In holding the Act unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that to the extent that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race[,]"
the legislation involved one of the basic civil rights of man. Id. at 541. Consequently, sterilization by vasectomy would deprive the petitioner of a basic liberty interest. Id.
21. Collateral to this expansion in nomenclature is the insistence by many courts and
commentators that there be a specific constitutional provision for each new term that can be
carved out of the broader concept of liberty. Professor Laurence H. Tribe states the problem
in the following way:
The resulting rights have been located in the "liberty" protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. They have been cut from the cloth
of the ninth amendment-conceived as a rule against cramped construction-or
from the privileges and immunities clauses of article IV and of the fourteenth
amendment. Encompassing rights to shape one's inner life and rights to control the
face one presents to the world, they have materialized from the "emanations" and
"penumbras"-most recently dubbed simply the "shadows"--of the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments. They elaborate the "blessings of liberty" promised in
the Preamble, and have been held implicit in the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-3, at 1308-09 (2d ed. 1988)
(footnotes omitted).
22. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in Order to . . .
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.").
23. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HtSTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990). The founders of this country, in speaking of liberty, adopted the
ideas of John Locke. Id. at 9-10. Locke's account of natural law served as the fundamental
principle from which natural rights were distilled. According to the prevailing ideology of the
founding generation, liberty had a plain and simple meaning: the capacity to exercise natural
rights. Id. However, the exercise of natural rights by one inevitably interferes with a similar
exercise by another. Imagine, for example, two celestial bodies from which forces are generated. Imagine further that those forces extend outwardly in all directions and to infinity. As
the two bodies approach each other, the likelihood that the forces from one will interfere
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every human being must be free from governmental interference in
making certain fundamental personal decisions.24
Contrary to the thinking of eighteenth-century lawyers who believed these fundamental rights to be self-evident,' legal scholars of
today are eager to identify each fundamental right supplementing the
Bill of Rights and every possible hybrid combination.26 Toward that
end, scrutiny of the Constitution as a whole and of its historical common law roots often serves as the primary analytical tool for the
Supreme CourtY The Court considers whether the right advocated is
so "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"' that it
should be judicially protected," or whether conduct involves the exwith those from the other increases significantly. Similarly, Locke theorized that since all men
began as equals, "[tihey were equally free from the authority of another and equally vulnerable to the 'invasion' of another." Id. at 10. It should be noted that in the eighteenth century,
only men had political rights; women were generally excluded from the political arena. Id. at
20 n.10. Paradoxically, the enslavement of an entire race of people was generally ignored by
those who embraced the equality among all men.
In order to avoid or reduce the conflicts that may arise from the exercise of one's
natural rights, we create a buffer zone beyond which we are not allowed to trespass even in
the exercise of our natural rights. With a system of government established as the guardian
of this neutral zone, rules are introduced to prevent any one person from encroaching into or
compromising the integrity of the zone. Encroachment, depending on its severity, can cost the
encroacher. The civil and criminal legal systems define the applicable costs for different levels of encroachment.
Having entered into this social compact to form a civil or political society, we necessarily relinquish some rights to the government which is installed as guardian of the neutral
zone. Id. at 10. Notwithstanding this compromise, Locke realized that "[t]here are, however,
certain natural and inalienable rights that cannot be ceded." Id. The resulting system is one
where "[the] needs and rights [of individuals are] the basis for-and the limits of-political
society. Instead of individuals subordinating their private interests to the needs of the community, the very purpose of the community [is] to give individuals freedom to pursue their
private interests." Id at 18. Simply stated, the purpose of our government is to protect the
individual liberty of every citizen. Id.
24. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (the distribution and
use of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a woman's right to abortion);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception).
According to some commentators, this partition between state and individual authority
to make fundamental personal decisions exists even in the absence of specific constitutional
dictates. See Steven C. Bennett, The Privacy and Procedural Due Process Rights of Hunger
Striking Prisoners, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1157, 1169 n.50 (1983) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). It is settled that the ninth amendment delineates the existence of unspecified fundamental rights. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.").
25. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 23.
26. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 21.
27. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
28. Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186, 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
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ercise of "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'im-

plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'"

Implicit in the Court's

reasoning is that one must be free to define oneself through self-

awareness and freedom of conscience. Thus, self-definition must be
the fundamental human right that is inseparable from human existence
and from which all other rights are born.'
A.

Evolution of the Right to Refuse Treatment

The continuing evolution of the right to refuse treatment is one
example of the courts' mastery at using the Constitution and common

law to identify a fundamental right not enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. The basic foundation of the right to refuse medical treatment

is the common law concept of individual self-determination."' At
common law, the concept of individual self-determination created a
zone of autonomy in which a patient's choice took precedence over
that of her physician.a2 The scope of this concept has been significantly broadened over the years. Today, it is generally accepted that a
patient may refuse any medical treatment, "even that which may save
or prolong her life."33 It is immaterial whether the patient lives or

494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.)). The basic analytical tools include examination of the legal
literature, caselaw and the common law history of the particular right in question. See
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 23, at 270.
29. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
The theory that government exists for the sole purpose of protecting the natural rights of its
citizens did not escape Americans at the time of the Constitution. See FARBER & SHERRY,
supra note 23, at 10. However, Locke, whose theories were readily embraced by the founding generation, also understood that in order to fully protect each citizen, certain rights had
to be relinquished to the government. Id. Consequently, liberty in an ordered society is "narrower . . . than the general capacity to exercise all natural rights." Id.
Despite its narrower scope in an ordered society, however, liberty by any definition
must include the irreducible minima that define who and what we are. Decisions that are
important to our individual destiny, to our identity, or that allow us to define ourselves as
human beings must remain impervious to governmental interference.
30. Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 754. Whether those rights are enumerated in the Constitution, reserved by the Ninth Amendment, or rooted in common law, they are derivative of
our liberty to define who and what we are without governmental interference. Id. Whether the
Court calls this liberty to self-definition a "right to privacy," Roe. 470 U.S. at 154, or a
"liberty interest," Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990), it
is simply defining a zone of liberty beyond which the government's reach will not be tolerated.
31. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). overruled
on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
32. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 1519, 1676 (1990).
33. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a
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dies as a result of this exercise of her right to self-determination.
Materiality resides in the fact that the patient is defining the conditions under which she lives or dies.' "Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent commits an assault ... ."' More than two decades prior to Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, in Union
Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford,36 the Supreme Court observed:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As
may be said
well said by Judge Cooley, "The right to one's person
' 37
to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone. "
Once an obscure phenomenon, refusal of medical treatment has
surfaced as the focal point of numerous judicial opinions and legal
and ethical periodicals. The current right to refuse medical treatment
is contained in In re Quinlan3' and its progeny. Given the emergence of the constitutional right to privacy 39 and the Supreme
Court's recognition in Roe v. Wade that such a right could extend to
fundamental questions of life and health," the Quinlan court reasoned that a patient's right to privacy supports her right to refuse
medical treatment.4' Several state courts have embraced the reasoning
of Quinlan,4 2 and the Supreme Court may not be far behind. Recently, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,4 3 the Supreme Court went a long way toward extending constitutional protec-

28-year-old quadriplegic cerebral palsy victim may assert her constitutional right to refuse
nasogastric hydration and nutrition).
34. Id. at 305.
35. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
36. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
37. Id. at 251 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29
(2d ed. 1888)).
38. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
39. See supra notes 16-19.
40.

410 U.S. at 153-54.

41. 355 A.2d at 663-64.
42. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1986);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 627 (Mass. 1986); Superintendent
of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1222-23 (NJ. 1985).
43. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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tion to the right of a competent patient to refuse medical treatment
and establishing it as a fundamental constitutional right.M
Cruzan originated in the court system of Missouri.45 On appeal,
the highest court of Missouri reasoned that an incompetent's wish to
withdraw medical treatment must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.' Moreover, according to the Missouri court, there is "no
unfettered right of privacy under our Constitution that would support
the right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance."'47 The court, based on prior right-to-privacy decisions, also
"carr[ied] grave doubts as to the applicability of privacy rights to
decisions to terminate the provision of food and water to an incompetent patient." 48 Even if such right existed, the court proposed, the
State's interest "in life, both its preservation and its sanctity" outweighed the personal interest of the individual or her family to refuse
treatment. 49 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Missouri, by a divided four-to-three vote, declined to uphold a right which, according to
some courts, is unquestionable and viable even if refusal of treatment
leads to the patient's death.' Since petitioner had failed to prove her

44. Id. at 278 (pronouncing a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment"); id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Freedom from unwanted
medical attention is unquestionably among those principles 'so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."') (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and
Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REv. 857, 863 (1992).
45. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1989) (en banc), affd sub nor.
Cnizan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Nancy Cruzan was involved
in a car accident in January of 1983. She was found lifeless and not breathing. Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 266. By the time rescuers managed to restart her heartbeat and breathing, she had
suffered irreversible brain damage. Id. A gastrostomy tube, through which nutrition and hydration was delivered to the patient, was implanted in her stomach. Id. After lingering in this
persistent vegetative state for several years, Nancy's parents requested that artificial nutrition
and hydration be discontinued. Id. at 267. The hospital denied their request. Id. at 268.
Thereupon, the Cruzans brought suit to compel the hospital to comply with their request. Id.
The trial court held in favor of the Cruzans and concluded that, under both the Federal and
Missouri Constitutions, the patient retained the right to terminate treatment. Id.
46. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 425.
47. Id. at 417.
48. Id. at 418.
49. Id. at 424.
50. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-06 (Ct. App. 1986).
The Supreme Court of Missouri reached its decision despite acknowledging the existence of a
common law right to individual autonomy. See Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 416. The court stated:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or to forebear because it will be better for him to do so, because

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:1385

wish to terminate treatment by clear and convincing evidence, the
Court held that medical treatment should continue.
The United States Supreme Court, by a sharply fragmented fiveto-four vote, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of MissouriI While affirming the standard of proof established by Missouri,
the Supreme Court eschewed Missouri's reasoning, which denied the
existence of the right to refuse treatment. 52 The Supreme Court opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist in which Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined, inferred from prior decisions a
constitutional right for a competent patient to refuse medical treatment, even if such treatment would be indispensable to life. 3 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor vehemently insisted that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of individuals to reject
undesired medical treatment.' Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion,
in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined, found the right to
be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration to be a "fundamental right."55 Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion found that "the
Constitution requires the State to care for Nancy Cruzan's life in a
way that gives appropriate respect to her own best interests."' Although concurring in the Court's decision, Justice Scalia remained
alone in his view that the Constitution implicitly committed the issue
at hand to the state legislative process.57
From this solitary position, however, Justice Scalia adroitly exposed the sophistry in the reasoning that some state courts had heretofore embraced. In his concurrence, the learned Justice specifically
rejected the active/passive distinction that these courts had espoused

it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be
wise, or even right.

Id. at 416 n.11 (alteration in original) (quoting Jom S. MI.L, ON LIBERTY, in 43 GREAT
BOOKs OF THE WESTERN WORLD 271 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952)); see also Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 228-35 (1990) (stating the belief that there exists a liberty interest
which permits refusal of antipsychotic drugs, even if taking the drug would be beneficial;
however, to the extent that the petitioner was incarcerated at the time of his refusal of
treatment, the Court reasoned that such refusal must be addressed with reference to the rights
and state interests at stake in the prison context).
51. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285, 287 (1990).

52. See id. at 277-78.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

278-79.
289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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as a rationale for allowing a patient to refuse treatment. 58 Prior to
Cruzan, state courts resolved the confrontation between suicide and

the consequence of voluntary refusal of life-sustaining treatment by
establishing this active/passive distinction. This unfortunate legacy
established a fictional line between "letting die," which the courts
labeled passive, and conventional suicide, which they labeled active.59
The courts have proposed two different interpretations of this
active/passive distinction. Both, however, start with the premise that
life-sustaining treatment merely forestalls natural death from the underlying disease.' Under this deterministic theme, refusal of treat-

ment simply allows nature to take its course.6 The patient does not
choose to die, but is simply a passive victim who is overwhelmed by
her illness; nor does the physician who turns off the life support
system help her die.62 By turning a blind eye to the physician's act

58. Id. at 296 (Scalia, J.,concurring).
59. Courts and commentators have defined the active method to include any procedure
that accelerates the dying process. See, e.g., Beschle. supra note 18, at 328 nn.35-36 and
accompanying text. The passive method, on the other hand, entails only that which goes no
farther than the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 328 n.36.
60. See Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1992).
61. See, e.g., id. at 63 ("The patient . . . who is being kept alive by a life-support system has taken a detour that usually postpones an immediate encounter with death ....
Stopping the treatment allows the delayed meeting with death to take place."); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Superintendent of Belchertown
State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (Mass. 1977) (explaining that since death
resulted from natural causes, the patient did not set the death producing agent in motion); In
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985) (holding that "[rIefusing medical intervention
merely allows the disease to take its natural course").
62. George J.Alexander, Death by Directive. 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 67, 82 (1988).
Absent this distinction, proponents of the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment would be
compelled to acknowledge a radical break with accepted mores and open the floodgates to
positions the courts have spurned. Courts have refused to endorse situations where the
physician's active participation in a suicide is clear. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thompson v.
Kevorkian, No. 90-390963-AZ (Cir. Ct. Oakland Cty., Mich., Feb. 5, 1991) reprinted in 7
ISSUES IN LAW AND MED. 107 (1991). But see Altman, supra note 12 (describing a grand

jury that refused to indict a physician who admitted to having facilitated the suicide of a
patient). California's reluctance to endorse premortem cryopreservation is, likewise, strongly
influenced by the fact that the procedure would require the active participation of a scientist.
See Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62. Were it not for this reasoning, courts would have had
to concede, for example, that the state may not act to prevent assisted suicide, although it
may temporarily interrupt the progress of the suicide to assess the competence of the consent.
See Kadish, supra note 44, at 868. Thus, no one could prevent a law student who is upset
at receiving a grade of "C" in Criminal Procedure from shooting himself in the head, so
long as he was competent when he arrived at the decision. The possibility of achieving such
unsavory results through an unbridled exercise of the right to autonomy or self-determination
has motivated the courts to adopt this false dualism. See id. at 864; Matthews, supra note
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of disconnecting a life-support system or a dialysis machine, courts
immunize the physician against criminal liability and allow his act to
fall on the omission side of the dichotomy.63 This line of demarcation, however, is logically and analytically indiscernible. As explained
by Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Cruzan:
It would not make much sense to say that one may not kill oneself
by walking into the sea, but may sit on the beach until submerged
by the incoming tide; or that one may not intentionally lock oneself
into a cold storage locker, but may refrain from coming indoors
when the temperature drops below freezing."
Under the first interpretation, it has been argued that the fictional
line between affirmative acts causing death and passive refusals of
lifesaving treatment satisfies the fundamental jurisprudential principle
of prohibiting misfeasance but allowing nonfeasance.' This argument
is suspect. Consider a patient who awakens in the hospital and realizes, to her dismay, that she has been attached to a life-support system.
Thereupon, the patient explicitly requests that she be removed from
the life-support system; however, the hospital personnel refuses to
comply with her request. Finally, the patient detaches the system
herself and dies moments later. It is highly unlikely that a court
would interpret the intentional removal of a system, intended to maintain the very life of a non-consenting person, as a nonfeasance,' or
claim that the patient was a passive victim of her illness. According
to current legal standards, such action would constitute suicide since
the patient will have achieved her own death intentionally and by
affirmative actions. On the other hand, if the patient's physician simply complied with the patient's request that the life-support system be
removed, the outcome would be different. Presumably, it would be
interpreted as a nonfeasance since the physician would only be effecting the desire of the patient. The determinant seems to be whether
the person wishes to die, as would be the case when the patient takes
affirmative action to detach herself from the life-support system, or

18, at 737-38; see also Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and
Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519, 532 (1992).
63. See Kadish, supra note 44, at 864.
64. 497 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. See Matthews, supra note 18, at 737; see also Kadish, supra note 44, at 864 ("Perhaps there is some support for this approach in the legal principle that imposes no duty to
act to prevent a prohibited harm except in specified circumstances.").
66. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56.
at 373-75 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance).
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simply wishes to have life-sustaining treatment removed. Some commentators find this distinction to be useless and generally "too insensitive to be ethical." 67
The second interpretation of this dichotomy is grounded more on
the voluntary nature of the patient's decision rather than on the passive nature of the methods used. 68 This is the more persuasive view,
since it now has the strong arm of the United States Supreme Court
in its comer. The Court has recognized a patient's right to refuse
treatment when there is clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
desire to refuse treatment.69 Under the Court's analysis, this standard
of proof encompasses the State's interests that must be weighed in
the context of the right to refuse treatment. 7 Accordingly, once the
patient's desire has been proven by clear and convincing evidence,
the patient's choice should outweigh the countervailing state interests.
Satisfying the required burden of proof also validates the patient's
competency at the time she makes the decision. Therefore, it is evident that the basic requirement is that the patient be competent when
she makes the decision to forego treatment. Under this interpretation,
a patient who has detached herself from a life-support system, with or
without the help of a physician, and has died soon after has not
committed suicide. As long as the patient unambiguously and explicitly expressed her desire to be removed from the life-support system
and was competent when she made that decision, her wish will be
honored.7
Similarly, under this interpretation, premortem cryopreservation
should be constitutionally protected if the right is limited to competent, terminally ill patients. Grounding the right on the voluntary
nature of the decision should also alleviate the fear that patients will

67. See Alexander, supra note 62, at 83.
68. See Beschle, supra note 18, at 331.
69. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990).
70. Id. at 281-83.
71. The rationality of the decision, according to some cases, is immaterial. See, e.g.,
Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (respecting a patient's
decision not to submit to amputation of her gangrenous foot and explaining that the irrationality of the patient's decision did not justify a conclusion that she was legally incompetent).
This interpretation thus shows great respect for personal autonomy. However, respect for
personal autonomy does not mean that one is completely free to exercise all rights unconditionally. Generally, there are state interests to be considered. See infra notes 197-233 and
accompanying text. While a general state interest in preserving life rarely trumps the patient's
choice under this interpretation, other state interests, such as the prevention of suicide and
protection of minor children, may be more compelling.
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be coerced into premortem cryopreservation.7 2 Establishing procedures that require physicians to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the patient's choice was made voluntarily,73 and that the
patient was terminally ill, could curtail the possibility of coercion.7'
Mindful that the truly bad actor will not be deterred by the establishment of strict guidelines for premortem cryopreservation, any remaining threat of coercion should be handled by tort and criminal laws.
B. Right to Premortem Cryopreservation
The right of self-determination protects one's right to control
one's bodily integrity and shields a person from nonconsensual bodily
invasions.' It establishes the limits of the medical profession's control over the patient's body and vests in the patient the right to refuse
medical treatment.76 Logically, the right to self-determination should
also support a patient's right to actively and independently direct her
health care with the assistance of a physician.'
In an effort to direct his own health care, Thomas Donaldson
sought to have his body cryopreserved premortem, before his pro-

72. In Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, one of the reasons cited by the California Court of
Appeal for denying Donaldson request for injunctive relief was that patients may be coerced
into undergoing cryopreservation. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 64 (Ct. App. 1992) (relying on the
difficulty of evaluating the assister's motives or determining the presence of undue influence
in denying petitioner's request for an injunction).
73. The Supreme Court recently upheld this standard of proof in cases involving the
right to refuse treatment. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
74. Recently, the Netherlands adopted a set of guidelines for voluntary euthanasia of
terminally ill patients. See Tamara Jones, Netherlands Law Sets Guidelines for Euthanasia,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at Al. Many of the requirements have the effect of reducing, if
not entirely eliminating, the possibility of coercion. For example, the law requires that the
patient make the request repeatedly and entirely of his or her own free will. Id. Furthermore,
the physician is required to consult with the patient alone to ensure that the patient is not
under duress, and follow the consultation with a report to the appropriate authorities. Id.
Additional concerns with coercion are alleviated by requiring that two physicians be consulted
to confirm that all criteria are met. Id. Physicians who fail to meet the established guidelines
may still face criminal charges. Id.
75. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
76. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261. Certain state interests, however, play an important role
in the expansion or constriction of that right. For example, the right to self-determination is
severely constricted when one is incarcerated for some criminal act. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990) ("The extent of a prisoner's right . . . to avoid the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement.").
77. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 490 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1016 (1990) ("The choice to undergo treatment is an individualized one which reflects
the patient's unique perspective.").
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gressing brain tumor overwhelmed him.7" The petitioner conceded
that after cryopreservation, he would be dead pursuant to section 7180
of the California Health and Safety Code, 9 which instructs that the
determination of death must be made "in accordance with accepted
medical standards."' Under the current medical standards, a person

78. See Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal, Rptr. 2d 59, 59.
79. Determination of death
(a)
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be
made in accordance with accepted medical standards.
(b)
This article shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this article among states
enacting it.
(c)
This article may be cited as the Uniform Determination of Death Act.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1993). The statute is the codification of
the Uniform Determination of Death Act. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, 12
U.L.A. 384, 386 (West Supp. 1989) [hereinafter UDDA]. A majority of the states that have
brain death laws have adopted the UDDA. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-101 (Michie 1991);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 7180; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-136 (West 1992);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-10-16 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-14-3 (West 1992);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-204 to -206 (1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2811-2813
(West 1964); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135
(West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-36-1 to -3 (1972); Mo. STAT. § 194.005 (Vernon
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (Michie
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-D:l to -D:2 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01
(1991); OHIO CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 31213123 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 432.300 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1020110203 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-43-450 to -460
(Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-34-1 to
-2 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-10-1 to -4 (1991);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-19-101 to -103 (1993). Nebraska has also recently adopted the Uniform
Determination of Death Act in Legislative Bill 906. See 1992 Neb. Laws 906.
80. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180. Prior to the adoption of the UDDA,
the cessation of cardiac and respiratory functions had been interpreted as death. The accuracy
with which one could predict clinical death once the signs of a beating heart and breathing
were absent led to their status as indicators of life. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488
(4th ed. 1968) (defining death as the "cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and
vital functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 434 (27th ed. 1988) (defining death as "the cessation of life;
permanent cessation of all vital bodily functions"). These earlier definitions of death were
formulated at a time when medical science considered the heart the center of the body's
functions. See William F. Arnet, Comment, The Criteria For Determining Death in Vital
Organ Transplants-A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220, 222 & n.l1 (1973); see
also James E. Hannah, The Signs of Death: Historical Review, 28 N.C. MED. J. 457, 458
(1967). Consequently, little emphasis was placed on the functions of the brain. According to
some commentators, two factors contributed to the lack of focus on brain functions. The first
was "the medical profession's desire to place the definition of death on an integrated basis,
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is legally dead if she has sustained irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or irreversible cessation of all functions of
the entire brain, including the brain stem." As a result, the scientists

who assist in the cryopreservation of a subject would have either
committed a homicide 2 or aided or encouraged a suicide. 3

stressing the idea of total stoppage of bodily functions." Amet, supra, at 222. The second
was the paucity of information that existed about the processes of the human brain. Id.
Advances in medical technology quickly demonstrated the inadequacies of defining
death in terms of the cessation of cardiac and respiratory functions. Specifically, the introduction of respiration machines and electronic cardiac stimulation made it easier to maintain
respiration and heartbeat, even with a severely damaged brain. Id. at 223. Through the use of
these machines, a patient could conceivably be brain-dead, with little or no blood flow to the
brain, and still be considered alive under the earlier definitions of death, as long as artificial
respiration and electronic heart stimulation are maintained.
81. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180. The real impetus toward a change in
the traditional definitions of death was the advent of vital organ transplantation techniques,
specifically heart and lung transplants. Amet, supra note 80, at 224. The need to have at
least a functional heart, lung, or liver for transplantation brought into focus the inadequacies
of the earlier legal definitions of death. Id.; see also J. STUART SHOWALTER, Determining
Death: The Legal and Theological Aspects of Brain-Related Criteria, 27 CATH. LAW. 112,
117 (1982). Under these definitions, a surgeon would have had to wait for heartbeat and
respiration to stop before removing the desired organ. Arnet, supra note 80 at 224. At this
stage, the vital organ would have already begun to deteriorate, thus significantly reducing the
probability for a successful transplant. Id.; see also Eliot Corday, Death in Human Transplantation, 55 JAMA 629 (1969). As a result, physicians began to use brain death as the determinative factor in deciding the time of clinical death. This daring step in the evolution of the
current standards of death was not without legal consequences. See, e.g., People v. Lyons, 15
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2240 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 21, 1974); see also C. Anthony Friloux,
Jr., Death, When Does it Occur?, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 10, 14-15 (1975). Although no surgeon had ever been held criminally liable for removing a vital organ from a person before
his heartbeat and respiration stopped, the medical community lobbied intensely for a reformulation of the legal definition of death, and encouraged elected officials to undertake the task.
See Alexander M. Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards For
Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 92 &
n.19 (1972). These efforts culminated in the adoption of the UDDA.
82. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187, 189 (West 1993).
83. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1993). Our antipathy toward suicide has its
origin in English common law. William Blackstone explained the rationale for this antipathy
in the following way:
Self-Murder, the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers,
who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they had not the fortitude to
endure . . . was punished by the Athenian law with cutting off the hand ....
And also the law of England wisely and religiously considers, that no man hath a
power to destroy life, but by commission from God, the author of it: and, as the
suicide is guilty of a double offense; one spiritual . . . the other temporal, against
the king who hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects; the law has
therefore ranked this among the highest crimes.
Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31-32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (emphasis added) (quoting 4
WiLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS 189 (8th ed. 1778)).
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The Donaldson court started its analysis by acknowledging a
patient's right to medical self-determination. 4 Citing Bouvia v. Superior Court," the court conceded that "a patient may refuse treatment
even though withholding of treatment creates a life-threatening situation. ' s Moreover, the Court acknowledged Donaldson's specific right
to undergo cryopreservation as being equally as compelling as the
State's general interest in protecting lifeY Despite these concessions,
the court refused Donaldson's prayer for relief and held that he had
no constitutional right to premortem cryogenic suspension. The stated
rationale was that Donaldson was simply choosing to commit suicide
with the assistance of others. 8 Such action, according to the court,
deeply offended the State's interest in ensuring that people are not
influenced to kill themselves. 9 Hence, the court concluded that the
State's interest "must prevail over the individual['s] because of the
difficulty ... of evaluating the motives of the assister or determining
the presence of undue influence."'
The court's reasoning in support of its conclusion that Donaldson
would in fact be committing suicide was faulty. Furthermore, the
nexus that the court tried to build between premortem
cryopreservation and physician-assisted suicide was spurious. Once the
goals of the two concepts are examined, the apparent analogy breaks
down.
Suicide and cryopreservation cannot be equated. In order to
commit suicide, one must have the specific intent or purpose to take
one's life9" and must take deliberate action that results in one's

84. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62; see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990).
85. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
86. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62.
87. Id. at 63. The state interests normally considered include preserving human life,
preventing suicide, protecting innocent third parties such as children, and maintaining the
ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 62; see also infra notes 197-233 and accompanying text.
88. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63.

89. Id. at 64.
90. Id. That state interest, along with others, is addressed in part II of this Note.
91. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1985) (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes):
(a)
Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i)
if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result; and
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death.92 Thus, in order to prove that Donaldson had in fact commit-

(ii)
if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes
that they exist.
Id.
92. See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 752.1022 (1992) (defining suicide or "It]he voluntary self-termination of life" as "conduct by which a person expresses the specific intent to
end, and attempts to cause the end of, his or her life"); see also Hepner v. Department of
Labor & Indus., 250 P. 461, 463 (Wash. 1926) (suicide is "[a] voluntary willful choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which knows the purpose and the physical
effect of the suicidal act") (quoting In re Sponatski, 108 N.E. 466, 468 (Mass. 1915)).
Suicide has never been a statutorily defined crime in the United States. See In re
Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Cal. 1983); Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability
For Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 350 (1986). Several states, however, including
California, have statutes criminalizing assisting or causing suicide. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.41.100(l)(B), .120 (a)(2) (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3) (1989); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(2) (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1979);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11. § 645 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3406 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.215 (West 1987); MiSs. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105
(1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-307 (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1985); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 813 (West 1983); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.117, 163.125(1)(b) (1991); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-10 (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D.
CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1988); Tx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1989);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
The State of Michigan, in response to the actions of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, has recently joined
the ranks of states that prohibit assisting suicide. See MICH. Comp. LAWS § 752.1027 (1992
& Supp. 1993); see also State ex rel. Thompson v. Kevorkian, No. 90-390963-AZ (Cir. Ct.
Oakland Cty., Mich., Feb. 5, 1991), reprinted in 7 ISsuEs IN LAW & MED. 107, 108 (1991).
American proscriptions of assisting or causing suicide have their origins in early English common law. English common law treated suicide as a serious crime. See Shaffer, supra,
at 349; see also George P. Smith, I, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275,
290 (1989). Punishment for the crime of suicide was quite severe. The body was treated with
great ignominy; a stake was driven into the heart of the suicide, the body was quartered and
buried in a crossroads. Donald M. Wright, Note, Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United
States, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 156, 157 (1975). Moreover, all personal property belonging to the
suicide was forfeited to the Crown. Id. at 157.
Punishment for the crime was abolished in England in 1824. Id. However, suicide was
not decriminalized in that country until 1961 with the enactment of the Suicide Act. See
Smith, supra. at 307. The Suicide Act also abolished the crime of attempted suicide from
English criminal law. Id. It would have been utterly illogical to outlaw the attempt of an act
that is perfectly legal.
Suicide was criminalized on the rationale that killing oneself was a crime against God.
See supra note 83. That rationale, however, did not survive the passage of the Establishment
Clause in the United States. The Establishment Clause mandates that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The clause was intended
to prevent government from using religion as a basis for abridging the civil rights of its
citizens. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 23, at 228. During the Congressional debates of
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ted suicide with the assistance of others, it must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent or purpose to take his
own life and that he would in fact be dead under the standards set
forth in California Health and Safety Code section 7180.93 But the
element of intent is not satisfied in the case of premortem
cryopreservation. Moreover, the available scientific data does not
conclusively demonstrate that premortem cryopreservation results in

death, i.e., the irreversible cessation of gross anatomical functions.
These two issues will be discussed in turn.
1. Absence of Suicidal Intent
With complete judicial acquiescence, legislatures have defined
suicide as requiring the specific intent or purpose to take one's own
life. ' This definition, according to the courts, does not include the
situation where a patient refuses life-sustaining treatment." Essential-

ly, the courts reason that patients who refuse life-sustaining treatment
may have no desire to bring about their own death; rather, "they may
fervently wish to live, but to do so free of unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs, and without protracted suffering."' Hence,
they are not committing suicide.
This argument has drawn considerable attention from, and endorsement of, various scholars. They propose that in many cases
involving treatment refusal, the patient's mental state is more suitably
described as knowledge of imminent death rather than intent to cause

June 1789, James Madison proposed an earlier version of the Establishment Clause which
unambiguously emphasized the distaste of Americans for a government founded on religion;
after all, many of the colonists fled religious persecution. Id. The earlier draft of the clause,
the essence of which became part of the first amendment, read: "The civil rights of none
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed." Id. (emphasis added).
On the other hand, the "temporal" reason for criminalizing suicide, to wit, the king's
interest in preserving the lives of his subjects, remains viable in the United States as the
"state interest in perserving human life." See supra note 83. Currently, additional countervailing state interests also figure prominently in the calculus to determine whether
cryopreservation should be allowed. These interests are examined in the context of
cryopreservation in part I of this Note. See infra notes 197-235 and accompanying text.
93. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180.
94. See supra note 92; see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985).
95. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
426 n.11 (Mass. 1977) (holding that "in refusing treatment the patient may not have the
specific intent to die").
96. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (citing Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
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one's own death.' The patient's purpose is to live free of medical
treatment,98 despite his awareness of the practical certainty that his
conduct will cause his death." The argument loses its appeal, however, when one considers a terminally ill patient who, in the face of
medical futility, knows that the only way she can remain alive is to
be attached to a life-support system. If she requests that she be removed from treatment, she will have purposefully established circumstances that are practically certain to hasten her death."°
If one is to accept the reasoning that patients who refuse lifesustaining treatment lack suicidal intent, but in fact fervently wish to
live, one must question the parallel that the Donaldson court drew
between premortem cryopreservation and physician-assisted suicide. ' If there is ever a situation when the intent to die is not
present, it is during premortem cryopreservation. The very premise of
cryopreservation is the extension of life. The fact that the patient is
willing to endure the procedure with the slightest hope of future
revival is indicative of his desire to some day live "free of unwanted
medical technology, surgery, or drugs, and without protracted suffering."' 2 Therefore, a patient such as Donaldson, who wishes to be
cryopreserved is not committing suicide under this analysis because
he does not intend to take his own life. If a lack of suicidal intent is
the basis for extending constitutional protection to the right to refuse
treatment, similar protection must be extended to cryopreservation.

97. See Kadish, supra note 44, at 867.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1985) (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes):
(b)
Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i)
if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or
that such circumstances exist; and
(ii)
if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Id.
100. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 218.
101. See Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Ct. App. 1986) (reasoning
that cryopreservation is equivalent to physician-assisted suicide).
102. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985) (quoting Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss4/6

22

Polycarpe: Examining the Right to Premortem Cryopreservation
19931

PREMORTEM CRYOPRESERVATION

2. Reversibility of Gross Anatomical Functions
In Donaldson, the petitioner conceded the applicability and satisfaction of California Health and Safety Code section 7180.113 He
conceded that he would be dead under California Law."t° However,
since cryopreservation is predicated on the reversibility of gross anatomical functions where biological and cellular deaths have been
forestalled, the conclusion that Donaldson would be legally dead, as
defined by section 7180, is debatable and far from certain. If charges

of assisting suicide were to be levied against a scientist who had
performed premortem cryopreservation, the prosecution might have
some difficulty proving that the cessation of the patient's gross ana-

tomical functions are irreversible.

5

In order to survive a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal,
the State would be required to produce scientific evidence, through
expert testimony, that would prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
cessation of the subject's gross anatomical functions and the supporting biological and cellular functions are irreversible."° Given the
burden of proving every material element beyond a reasonable

103. Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory Relief and for an Injunction at 5, Donaldson v.
Van de Kamp, No. 181830 (Cal. Super. Ct. of Santa Barbara, April 3, 1992).
104. Id.
105. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180; cf. supra note 4.
106. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for opinion testimony by experts upon a determination by the court that: (a) the expert is sufficiently qualified in her
field to be allowed to testify, and (b) the proffered evidence would be helpful to the trier of
fact. FED. R. EVm. 702; see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1241-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aj'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Lombardi v. Dow
Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). The court must determine whether the expert's opinion is
based on data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field and not on hearsay thought to
be unreliable by other experts in the field. Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1244. However,
doubts should be resolved in favor of admissibility. Id. at 1242. Any hearsay problem with
regard to admissibility is resolved by Rule 803, which provides exceptions to hearsay that
accommodate this type of scientific evidence. FED. R. EvID. 803. To the extent that the
evidence is composed of published articles and treatises, it is admissible under Rule 803(18).
FED. R. EVID. 803(18). Furthermore, it may be admissible as records of regularly conducted
activity. FED. R. Evil. 803(6). Generally, researchers in any field produce, maintain, and
publish reports of their research activities. These types of reports are admissible under Rule
803(6) unless they are untrustworthy. Id.
The court must also determine whether the expert's conclusions are made with sufficient certainty to be useful given the applicable burdens of proof. See Agent Orange, 611 F.
Supp. at 1244; see also FED. R. EVID. 703. Thus, the decision to admit the scientific evidence is the product of a balancing test between the reliability and usefulness of the data
used in formulating the expert's opinion on the one hand, and the need to avoid waste of
time, confusion of the trier of fact, and prejudice on the other hand.
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doubt,"r7 the prosecution's expert should be required to state his
conclusions with a reasonable degree of medical certainty."1° More-

over, since cryopreservation, by definition, contemplates revivification
much later in the future, it would not be unreasonable to require the
expert to testify with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
cryopreservation would remain irreversible even in the future. In light
of the currently available scientific evidence and the dizzying speed
of proliferation of scientific methodology, it is highly unlikely that
any expert in the field of cryobiology would be willing to testify that
the procedure is irreversible and would remain so in the future.
The State is unlikely to meet its burden on the issue of irreversibility. Scientists have demonstrated that the viability of biological
and cellular activities is preserved during cryopreservation, and is
usually restored after the thawing process."° Moreover, techniques

for cryopreserving organs for later transplantation are enjoying considerable success and acceptance in the field of cryobiology."' Experiments on individual cells have led to the conclusion that cellular
viability is not significantly affected by cryopreservation."'

Even more demonstrative of the success of cryopreservation is its
widespread use and acceptance in the fields of in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer."' In a recent article, one scientist explained in

107. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
108. See Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1244; see also FED. R. EvID. 703.
109. See, e.g., Mike Adam et al., The Effect of Liquid Nitrogen Submersion on
CryopreservedHuman Heart Valves, 27 CRYOBIOLOGY 605 (1990) (discussing the clinical use
of human heart valves stored in liquid nitrogen at -130"C or below); Robyn Fisher et al.,
Cryopreservation of Pig and Human Liver Slices, 28 CRYOBIOLOGY 131 (1991) (viability of
cellular functions is significantly maintained after cryopreservation; pig liver slices retained
80-85% of protein synthesis, and human slices retained 54-89% of protein synthesis); see also
Sheila F. Mathias et al., Preservation of Viable Cells in the Undercooled State, 22 CRYOBIOLOGY 537 (1985) (finding that yeast cells can be preserved undercooled at -20"C for at least
16 weeks with no detectable loss of viability); S. Randolph May & D. Phillip Roberts, Development of a Passive Device for Freezing Large Amounts of Transplantable Skin at One
Time in a -70"C Mechanical Refrigerator,25 CRYOBIOLOGY 186 (1988) (skin frozen at -70"C
and rapidly thawed maintains biochemical activity for glucose oxidation, and provides a method for low cost cryopreservation of large amounts of allograft skin); James H. Southard,
Viability Assays in Organ Preservation, 26 CRYOBIOLOGY 232 (1989) (review of the techniques that have been used to aid in the development of organ preservation).
110. See May & Roberts, supra note 109 (discussing skin allografts).
111. See N.H. Jutte et al., Vitrification of Human Islets of Langerhans, 24 CRYOBIOLOGY
403 (1987) (concluding that human islets of Langerhans cryopreserved by vitrification are
functional in vitro).
112. See, e.g., Stephan Gordts et al., Survival and Pregnancy Outcome After Ultrarapid
Freezing of Human Embryos, 53 FERTILITY AND STERILTY 469 (1990); S.P. Leibo, Cryobiology: Preservation of Mammalian Embryos, 37 BASIc LinE Sc. 251 (1986).
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the abstract that:
The preservation of mammalian embryos has become a routine
procedure. Thousands of live offspring have been produced from
frozen-thawed embryos transferred into recipient foster mothers ....
Species whose embryos have been successfully preserved
include cattle, horse ....
baboon, and human ....
Mhe transfer

of frozen-thawed embryos of domestic animals is becoming almost
as efficient as is artificial insemination using frozen-thawed semen.
....

Maximum survival of embryos appears to be achieved

when intracellular water does not crystallize during cooling or during warming.
As a result of the growing efficiency of embryo preservation,
this method is being applied to a variety of practical situations ....

The freezing of cattle embryos is being used with in-

creasing frequency as an adjunct to commercial embryo transfer ....

[F9inally, the preservation of human embryos is finding

application in the field of in vitro fertilization."'
These results have removed the technique of cryopreservation from
the realm of science fiction and placed it in the ranks of accepted
scientific methodology.
A recent experiment conducted at the Medical Center for Fertility
Diagnostics and In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Belgium decisively demonstrates how cryopreservation is being effectively used in the creation of human life." 4 In that experiment, 237 human embryos, at different stages of development, were frozen for a
period of one day to seven months. After thawing, between 71 and
79% of the pronucleate and multipronucleate embryos resumed their
normal cleavage." 5 Evidently, the biological and cellular activities
were preserved through the freezing process. Moreover, of the forty
cleaved embryos that were also frozen-thawed, fifteen (or 37.5%)
survived thawing." 6 Lastly, thirty-four cleaved embryos were frozen

and thawed, then implanted in twenty patients during spontaneous
cycles with the goal of achieving pregnancy; four patients became
pregnant."' These experiments demonstrate that cryopreservation is
already accepted in certain areas of biology and is enjoying considerable success, although still in its infancy.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Leibo, supra note 112, at 269-70.
See Gordts, supra note 112.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id.
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There is a plethora of scientific evidence which, when taken
together, point to the rapid evolution of cryobiology. Cryobiology is
rapidly crossing from the realm of theoretical formulae to practical
scientific methodology. Recently, a scientist froze a dog for twenty
minutes at three degrees Celsius (approximately thirty-eight degrees
Fahrenheit) with no adverse physiological effects."' The dog's body
temperature was first lowered to twenty degrees Celsius (or sixtyeight degrees Fahrenheit). Following currently accepted cryobiological
techniques, its blood was replaced with a previously developed blood
substitute." 9 During the twenty minutes of suspended animation, the
animal's circulation was arrested and all life-support systems were
shut off."2 After twenty minutes at three degrees Celsius, circulation
was restarted, the blood substitute was replaced with the dog's own
blood, which had been appropriately refrigerated during the procedure,
and the dog was thawed to normal body temperature.' The animal
was thawed to perfect health and had been living for nine months
with no sign of ill health as of the time the results of the experiment
were published."
Scientists are also learning to move individual atoms."2 This
technique, referred to as nanotechnology, could be used to construct
new molecules and the microscopic machines which proponents of
cryopreservation plan to use in restoring the cellular integrity of
cryopreserved subjects during the revival stage." Scientists envision
these molecular computers as having the ability to mass-produce more
of themselves or most of the material products of this planet. More
importantly, they could be used to cure every disease."n They could
"be injected into the body to seek out and destroy diseased organisms
or undo the damage" caused by diseases that are, to this day, incurable. 26
With the advent of nanotechnology and the concurrent progress

118. See Dog 'Spunky' After It's Frozen in Test, L.A. TIMES, March 31, 1987, at A3.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Jon Van, Scientists Learn How to Move Individual Atoms, CHI. TRku., April 5,
1990, at C1.
124. See id.; WOWK & DARWIN, supra note 3, at 16 (discussing a very speculative and
futuristic plan for cryogenic revival).
125. Jon Roland, Molecular Machines: Tiny Computers Based on Nanotechnology-The
Next Generation After Semiconductors, COMPtrTERWORLD, Sept. 19, 1988, at 87.
126. Id.
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being made in the field of cryobiology, successful revival of a
cryopreserved person may not be far removed. In premortem
cryopreservation, once a cure for the subject's disease becomes available, it is theorized that gross anatomical functions will be reestablished with the use of these molecular computers and the cure applied.' The end result should be a living, breathing human being
who is free of the terminal illness or disease that afflicted him just
before cryopreservation t25 With the availability of such technology,
a persuasive argument can be made that a cryopreserved subject is
not dead as defined by the Uniform Determination of Death Act (the
"UDDA"). The UDDA, which has been codified in a majority of
states, requires that the cessation of gross anatomical functions be
irreversible in order for a person to be declared dead. 29 The gross
anatomical functions of a cryopreserved subject will probably be
capable of complete restoration once the technology is perfected.
III.

PROMOTING AMENDMENTS TO STATUTES
AGAINST AIDING OR ASSISTING SUICIDE

A majority of states have statutes that forbid assisted suicide.'
Courts and legislatures, however, have explicitly established the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as exceptions to
these statutes.' 3 ' Although they may result in the patient's death, the
withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment are constitutionally protected as exercises of the right to refuse treatment. 32 It
would be just as easy for legislatures to amend the existing statutes
proscribing suicide assistance to establish an exception for premortem
cryopreservation when requested by a competent, terminally ill patient. This Note proposes the following amendment to statutes forbidding assisting suicide:
If at least two independent physicians certify at least two months
apart that a patient is terminally ill; that state of the art medical

127. Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen, Nanotech Export Foresees Powerful

"Sugar Cube" Computers, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWoRK, Apr. 27, 1990.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 79.

130. See Smith, supra note 92, at 290-91.
131. For example, a statute in Nebraska provides that "[dieath resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in accordance with the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act shall not constitute, for any purpose a suicide or homicide." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 20-412(1) (Supp. 1992).
132. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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technology is unable to help the patient; that the patient will, within
a reasonable degree of medical certainty, die within one year from
the last date of certification; and the court finds no evidence of

coercion or fraud; then nothing in this chapter prohibits a person
from providing technical assistance to implement the wishes of a
competent

person

so

certified

to

undergo

premortem

cryopreservation.
The right to premortem cryopreservation advocated by this
amendment, like the right to refuse treatment, would be an exercise
of a person's right to self-determination. However, the right to selfdetermination presupposes a minimum level of capacity to act. The
implication is that without such capacity people may make decisions
that are inimical to their own well-being. Hence, decision-makers may
need protection from their own choices.'33 Accordingly, application
of the proposed amendment requires a judicial determination of the
patient's competency to decide to undergo premortem
cryopreservation.' 4

133. See Benjamin Freedman, Competence, Marginal and Otherwise: Concepts and Ethics,
4 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 53 (1981); see also James F. Drane, Competency to Give an
Informed Consent: A Model for Making Clinical Assessments, 252 JAMA 925 (1984). The
key point is not so much that the incompetent person would make a decision that may run
counter to her well-being; after all, competent people could make wrong choices that ultimately harm them without questioning the mental.process through which they arrived at these
choices. Notwithstanding the final choice made, the critical concern is that the integrity of the
mental process that leads to the choice has not been compromised so as to render the decision-maker incapable of assigning values to each factual component of the decision to be
made and properly weighing these values in her final choice. Of course, the value assigned
to each component is personal; thus, the standard for evaluating the mental process leading to
a specific choice must be subjective. See Freedman, supra, at 61.
134. Commentators agree that the determination of competency is a question for the
courts, although it is generally understood that medical professionals, more specifically psychiatrists, are well-placed to initiate the inquiry. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 133, at 60.
According to judicial authority, however, the determination by medical professionals of the
mental competence of a patient to guide the course of his medical treatment must submit to
judicial evaluation. See, e.g., Riese v. Saint Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr.
199, 212 (Ct. App. 1987). The reasoning is that the scientific methods used to make the
determination are not unimpeachable. Id. This methodological imprecision combined with the
inherent complexities of the human mind forecloses any possibility of achieving scientific
certainty. Id. Moreover, exemption of medical determinations of competency from such judicial evaluation would grant physicians a power over others that is inimical to the great value
society places on the autonomy of the individual. Id. at 213. But see Drane, supra note 133,
at 927 (attempting to alleviate the fear that too much power will shift toward physicians who
make competency determinations and away from patients whose choices should be respected,
by arguing that any increase in the physicians' power actually serves the patients' welfare
and that this loss in the patients' power never reaches the point where patients' self-determination is set aside).
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A. Determination of Competency
There are two levels of inquiry that must be conducted in determining a patient's competency. 135 The threshold inquiry is whether
the patient is conscious and lucid enough to express a desire to unAssuming that the patient's consciousness
dergo the procedure."
and lucidity are authenticated, the court will next inquire whether the
patient is competent.'37
Presumptively, people are competent to make the decisions that
affect their personal life, 38 provided that they have the necessary
prerequisites to make an informed decision.'39 The underlying rationale for the presumption is that the individual's informed decision is
the best decision for that individual. The patient, therefore, is in the
"best position thoroughly to assess and evaluate the circumstances of
his own life, the effect that different medical treatments will have on
the quality of that life, and ultimately to make the value judgments
that individuals in our society have a right to make for them-

135. It should be noted, however, that medical competence-competence to make decisions about one's own medical care-is not to be confused with legal competence to stand
trial. It is clear that these two capabilities are not the same. See United States v. Charters,
829 F.2d 479, 495 & n.23 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
136. See Matthews, supra note 18, at 724.
137. The importance of the patient's decision-making ability or competence should not be
underestimated. Indeed, in the majority of cases in which courts have ruled against a patient's
refusal of life-sustaining treatment, the patient's competency to make a rational decision about
his or her choice of treatment was a determinative factor. E.g, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1225-26 (NJ. 1985).
138. See ROBERT I. SIMON, M.D., CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 104 (1987); see
also Charters, 829 F.2d at 495 ("'[IThe law will presume sanity rather than insanity, competency rather than incompetency."') (quoting Incompetent Persons, 41 AM. JUR. 2D § 129
(1968)); Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (Wash. 1967) (holding that the law "will
presume that every man is sane and fully competent until satisfactory proof to the contrary is
presented.").
In Charters, the court indicated that a patient is entitled to be presumed competent
until adjudicated incompetent. Charters, 829 F.2d at 495. In order to overcome the presumption of competency, the party challenging the patient's competency has the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the patient does not understand the nature, terms, and
effect of a consent given for a particular medical intervention. See Addington v. Texas. 441
U.S. 418 (1979) (discussing proof issues relating to incompetency in the context of civil
commitment, and concluding that the clear and convincing standard properly allocates the risk
of error between the parties while acknowledging the importance of the decision in cases
where the "subtleties and nuances" of psychiatric diagnosis render certainty impossible).
139. See Kevin R. Wolff, Determining Patient Competency in Treatment Refusal Cases,
24 GA. L. REV. 733, 752-55 (1990).
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selves."'" Therefore, there must be procedural safeguards to insure
that the patient's decision is founded on accurate and medically reliable facts.'4' The most obvious of these safeguards, and simplest to
implement, is to require that the patient's diagnosis and prognosis be
assessed in light of currently available technology. 4 2
Competency can be evaluated through a judicial determination or
a medical determination. However, judges have indiscriminately adopted clinicians' assessments to determine competency.'43 During a judicial evaluation of competency, courts often apply the test traditionally employed in the context of informed consent, i.e. "whether the
patient is sufficiently able to comprehend his situation, the alternatives
available, and the risks and possible benefits of each alternative, so as
to make an informed decision."'" Analysis of the test, however, reveals that the approaches used during a medical determination often
serve as the basis of the court's evaluation. 45 In the medical field,

140. Charters, 829 F.2d at 495.
141. Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon. Coming to Terms with Death: The
Cruzan Case, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 817, 827 (1991).
142. Arguably, projected advancements in technology should also be evaluated since they
may impact upon the patient's prognosis. Of course, our evaluations should be limited to
projected advancements which are expected to occur within a reasonable time, so that the
patient may have an opportunity to benefit from them.
143. See Wolff, supra note 139, at 749.
144. Matthews, supra note 18, at 725; see also Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 225
(1985) (in determining competence, "the court should consider whether the patient has made
a decision to decline the medical treatment, is fully aware of the consequences and alternatives, and is competent to make the choice").
145. See THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, M.D. & PAUL S.APPELBAUM, M.D., CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 215 (1982). Arguably, a court's adoption of the medical
assessment of competency is favorable to the patient. It guarantees a decision based on true
scientific facts provided by the treating physician. To the extent that judges do not possess
the medical expertise to reach decisions on matters of mental health and their impact on
patient competence, reliance on the medical expert's scientific evidence adds accuracy and
credibility to the judge's decision. On the other hand, an adversarial proceeding where the
patient is challenging the determination made by the treating physician with regard to the
patient's competency necessarily puts the patient at a disadvantage if judges base their decisions strictly on the physician's assessment. See Wolff, supra note 139, at 750. The proposed
solution is that judges should not rely solely on the physician's evidence; rather, they should
use all available evidence in addition to the scientific evidence provided by the treating physician. Id.
This solution seems to suggest, albeit subliminally, that rationality can be demonstrated
in the way in which a person orders his life within our society. Thus, decisions other than
medical treatment, but involving equivalent seriousness and complexity, may be admitted in
evaluating a patient's competence to make medical treatment decisions. This argument is
supported by Benjamin Freedman's proposal that competence should perhaps be judged in a
dispositional way. See Freedman, supra note 133, at 65. He explains that:
If a person has been disposed to be competent-if he has ordered his life within
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five approaches have been utilized in determining competency: "(1)

evidencing a choice; (2) reasonable outcome of choice; (3) rational
reasons for choice; (4) ability to understand; and (5) actual understanding."'46 The following subsections analyze the applicability of
each approach to the proposed amendment.
1. Evidencing a Choice
Under this test, "[o]ne is competent to consent to treatment if
one is able to express consent to, or refusal of, that treatment, for
whatever reasons and despite the seeming unreasonableness of the
outcome."'4 7 The test appears to show great respect for, and deference to, individual autonomy, since it does not attempt to evaluate the
patient's rationale for making a choice.t4 '

Notwithstanding its apparent respect for individual autonomy, the
"Evidencing a Choice" test may be too minimal to be useful in the
proposed statutory scheme and runs counter to the intent of the
amendment. Any decision in favor of or against a procedure would
not be questioned because it would be indicative of competence.
Whether the choice is based on faulty information or whether the
patient understands the facts necessary to formulate the decision is
inconsequential. Indeed, there would be no way of evaluating the
patient's understanding of the factual infrastructure upon which the

choice is built. One could not conclusively state that the patient intended to make the choice evidenced. Consequently, any further inquiry into the patient's maturity, intellect, or emotional state would be

our society, made and carried out long-range plans, and so on-then extraordinarily
strong evidence would need to be produced in attempting to prove that he had
failed to achieve a competent decision. The reverse would be true for one with
dispositional incompetence.
Id. According to Freedman, traditional aspects of adjustment such as work experience and
family life, should be examined in determining competence. Id. The probative value of this
type of non-medical evidence lies in the fact that the evidence indicates the patient's acceptance and understanding of, and conformity with, the constraints that are indispensable in an
ordered society. The requirement that one member of this society must order his affairs in
"light of what others may be expected to do" presumes, according to Freedman, "a degree of
commonality and predictability of motivation." Id. at 64. It is this conformity with common
and predictable behavior decisions which reinforces the presumption of competence.
146. Wolff, supra note 139, at 744-49.
147. See Freedman, supra note 133, at 59.
148. Cf. Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D. & Loren H. Roth, M.D., M.P.H., Competency to
Consent to Research; A Psychiatric Overview, 39 ARCHI'm GEN. PSYCHIATRY 951, 955-56
(1982) ("[a] standard that requires no more than evidencing a choice would maximize autonomy') (emphasis added).
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superfluous for the purposes of this test.149
Furthermore, the test presents no analytical method for differentiating between a true choice and one that is simply an artifact resulting from the very application of the test. Illustratively, if a patient is
presented with a set of choices and requested to select one, it is
highly likely that the patient will choose one of the choices presented.
However, that choice may not be the result of conscientious deliberation and comprehension of the choices. A particular alternative may
be chosen simply because it figures among the choices presented.
Hence, the test never truly addresses "the question to which competency is the answer."' 50
In a society where there is no test for competency, all consents
and refusals would be unconditionally accepted. Incompetence would
be presumed only where there is an absence of decision..' or possibly where there is an expression of two mutually exclusive choices.' Paradoxically, the identical result is achieved under this "Evi53
dencing a Choice" test, which purports to test patient competency.
The test's apparent deference to individual autonomy is in fact an
artifact of its application. Arguably, the test does not care enough
about individual autonomy to make a conscientious effort to weigh it
in the evaluation of patient competence.
The statutory scheme proffered in this Note requires more than
simply making a choice in favor of cryopreservation. It requires medical evaluation of the patient's prognosis and verification of the diagnosis by at least two physicians. Thus, evidencing a choice as an
approach for measuring competency is not satisfactory under this
statutory scheme.
2. Reasonable Outcome of Choice
Under the "Reasonable Outcome of Choice" test, one is competent if one decides in favor of a choice, the outcome of which is
reasonable. 5" The test would logically require that a qualified ap-

149. Freedman, supra note 133, at 60.
150. Id. at 62.
151. See id. at 62.
152. See, e.g., Department of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 207 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978) (patient who suffered from gangrene which threatened her life "evidence[d] a
strong desire to live and an equally strong desire to keep" her dead gangrenous feet and
refused to make a choice).
153. Freedman, supra note 133, at 62-63.
154. Id. at 61.
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praiser evaluate the consequences flowing from the patient's choice
and concur that such a course of action is reasonable. The patient's
decision, under this approach, is disregarded if the appraiser simply
thinks the consequences flowing from that choice are potentially too
harmful to the patient. Closer scrutiny of this test reveals its paternalistic attitude and utter disregard for patient autonomy.'55
The deficiency in this test resides in the fact that it focuses only
on the results of the choice made,'56 while completely neglecting the
mental process which led to the choice. The test severs from consideration the very aspect of choice that is indicative of mental competence. Consequently, courts and commentators have criticized the test
in unison.' 7 The Fourth Circuit vehemently voiced its intolerance
for this test in United States v. Charters.5 ' There, the court stated
that "a test which . . . evaluates competency according to the results
of decisions[] is too paternalistic and poses a tremendous threat to the
right of the individual to make choices which reflect his unique concerns."' 59 Freedman adds a less sonorous but equally persuasive
voice by explaining that freedom is to be found in a process, not in a
particular result."W Since one can reach the same result through autonomous or coerced action, Freedman correctly identifies the actual
mental process leading to the choice as the pivotal player in the
determination of competency.
Given the medical profession's unwillingness to question the
fundamentals of the Hippocratic Oath,' 6' a physician is likely to veto as incompetent any decision which results in an unpopular medical
outcome. Thus, a patient who decides to forego life-sustaining treat-

155. Id. (suggesting that the "Reasonable Outcome of Choice" virtually eliminates patient
choice); see also United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 496 n.26 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
156. Freedman, supra note 133, at 61.
157. E.g., id. at 59-61; see also Charters, 829 F.2d at 496 n.26.
158. 829 F.2d 479.
159. Id. at 496 n.26.
160. Freedman, supra note 133, at 61.
161. See Curley Bonds, The Hippocratic Oath: A Basis for Modem Ethical Standards,
264 JAMA 2311 (1990) (arguing that the fundamental principles of the ancient oath are still
applicable); see also Goncaves v. Saab, 538 N.E.2d 142, 147 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 545 N.E.2d 110 (I11. 1989) (quoting The Oath of Hippocrates: "I SWEAR BY APOLLO THE PHYSICIAN . .. I WILL FOLLOW THAT SYSTEM OF REGIMEN
WHICH-ACCORDING TO MY ABILITY AND JUDGMENT-I CONSIDER FOR THE
BENEFIT OF MY PATIENTS-AND ABSTAIN FROM WHATEVER IS DELETERIOUS
AND MISCHIEVOUS-I WILL GIVE NO DEADLY MEDICINE TO ANYONE IF
ASKED-NOR SUGGEST ANY SUCH COUNSEL ...
.").
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ment or undergo premortem cryopreservation is more likely to be
declared incompetent. Medical professionals are likely to consider the
decision irrational and not a true expression of the patient's will. "It
hardly needs to be said that if a person can be declared incompetent
based on disagreement with a medical choice he has made, the right
to make personalized and individual decisions concerning one's own
162
body would become a nullity."
On the other hand, the medically correct decision, one from
which flows a popular outcome, is usually accepted as a sign of
competence. Essentially, if there is the slightest chance of survival
with treatment, then consenting to treatment should, presumably, be
the choice of a competent patient.'63 Problems arise, however, when
a competent patient refuses treatment or chooses to undergo a procedure like premortem cryopreservation. Such a patient is more likely to
be labelled incompetent. The patient would be penalized simply for
not choosing conventional treatment. Clearly, under the "Reasonable
Outcome of Choice" test "your choice is obeyed not because you
decided it, nor because you decided it, but rather because you decided
it."'' " Like the "Evidencing a Choice" test, the "Reasonable Outcome of Choice" shows its shortcoming by failing to address the
question to which competency is the answer.
An alternative way of analyzing the "Reasonable Outcome of
Choice" approach is to view it in light of the decision to be made
and the disparity between the foreseeable outcomes. Illustratively, a
choice to forego an available cure for an acute condition that can
cause death if left untreated would not trump the choice to accept the
cure and live. Under such circumstances, the choice in favor of accepting the cure is weightier. Contrarily, the choice to undergo
premortem cryopreservation should trump a choice to accept treatment
where such treatment would be futile. If medical technology is impotent, the patient would still face death within a relatively short period
of time; on the other hand, the patient may choose to undergo
cryopreservation sometime prior to natural death, with the hope of
future revival. Given the disparity between these two outcomes, the
choice is clear; premortem cryopreservation is far more desirable,

162. Charters, 829 F.2d at 495.
163. But see Department of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 210 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978) (indicating that a choice unreasonable to others, but made by a competent, informed patient would be honored).
164. Freedman, supra note 133, at 61.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss4/6

34

Polycarpe: Examining the Right to Premortem Cryopreservation
19931

PREMORTEM CRYOPRESERVATION

since it is the only choice which really provides the patient with the
possibility of life.
The judicial inquiry into the patient's competency should not rest
on a blanket statement that the patient is incompetent simply because
the patient chose a course that is unpopular with the medical profession. Rather, the state should have the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that its proposal for the patient's therapy is better and more rational than the choice made by the patient. Rather
than falsely assume that result is the sole factor, i.e., that process has
nothing to do with competence, the state should prove that no reasonable person would rationally choose premortem cryopreservation over
its proposal." s
It has been argued that the "Reasonable Outcome of Choice" test
fosters the social goals that are represented by the state's interests in
preserving life and maintaining the integrity of the medical profession." Analysis of these countervailing state interests reveal that
they are not compelling enough to prevent a competent, terminally ill
patient from undergoing premortem cryopreservation. 67
3. Rational Reasons for Choice
Of all the tests used to evaluate patient competency, the "Rational Reasons" test is the most reliable. Under this test, "[o]ne is competent to consent to treatment if one has followed a rational process
in making up one's mind, if one can give or has given rational reasons for the choice made." t" The reliability of the test stems from
the fact that it actually evaluates the mental process leading to a
particular decision. The "Rational Reasons" test concerns itself with
what goes into the decision and not merely with the results flowing
from the decision."
Assuming that the patient has received reliable information, the
test evaluates how the patient manipulates the information to reach a
decision.t"' Once presented with the relevant information, the patient
165. The State's proposal is for the patient to choose death. To the extent that the patient could not be forced to submit to any kind of medical treatment unless certain State
interests are found to be weightier than his or her decision to refuse treatment, see infra.
notes 197-233 and accompanying text, the state may well be condemning the patient to a
painful death preceded by a gradual loss of dignity and self-control.
166. See Wolff, supra note 139, at 745.
167. See infra notes 197-233 and accompanying text.
168. See Freedman, supra note 133, at 59.
169. See Wolff, supra note 139, at 746 (1990).
170. See id.
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should be able to formulate premises that are acceptable in our society."' In other words, these premises must be recognizable by others so that if any member of the society were presented with the

same information under the same circumstances, manipulation of the
information should lead to an equivalent set of premises. Furthermore, the premises must lead to conclusions that are consistent with a
logical evaluation of the starting premises.
In evaluating the
patient's chain of reasoning leading to a particular conclusion, the
examiner should be able to look to the patient for an explanation of
the determinative factors in his decision and the degree of importance
assigned to each factor. 74 Essentially, the test requires that patients
weigh the risks and benefits of various treatment options in a manner
75

that is consistent with the value they have assigned to each risk and benefit.

171. Freedman, supra note 133, at 64.
172. The predictability of the conclusions resulting from a logical analysis of the facts
presented actually support our idea of freedom of choice. Freedom of choice in our society
involves a certain reciprocity which requires that one actor conform his behavior "in light of
what others [might] be expected to do." Id. at 64. Since equivalent restraints are placed on
every member of society, we achieve a degree of commonality and predictability of motivation and reasoning. Id. As stated by Freedman:
That which allows us to grant freedom of action in our society is the warranted
belief that, by and large, one person's choices will be recognizable by others. It is
only given this condition that we can empathize with a person's behavior, and it is
only given this condition that behavior becomes sufficiently predictable to enable
us to live together in society.
Id.
173. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 148, at 30-31; see also Freedman, supra note
133, at 64.
174. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 148, at 30-31.
175. Id. at 30. In an empirical investigation of the capacity of geriatric patients to consent to research participation, the researcher used a seven-point scale to measure the "quality
of reasoning" (or rationality of reasoning) of the subjects. See Barbara Stanley, Ph.D. et al.,
The Elderly Patient and Informed Consent: Empirical Findings, 252 JAMA 1302, 1303
(1984). Each point evaluated the patient's ability to weigh the risks and benefits associated
with a particular treatment option:
1.
Shows no evidence of weighing risks and benefits, and gives an entirely
irrelevant response to the question, "Why did you decide to be (or not be)
in the study?"
2.
Shows no evidence of weighing risks or benefits, or mentions irrelevant
risks or benefits.
3.
Weighs either risks or benefits globally.
4.
Specifically identifies and weighs either risk or benefit.
5.
Weighs risks and benefits globally.
6.
Specifically identifies and weighs either a risk or a benefit, and globally
weighs the other factor.
7.
Explicitly identifies and weighs both the risks and benefits.
Id. at 1303-04.
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While the test requires consistency in the premises reached by
any competent member of this society who is presented with the
same facts under the same circumstances, it does not require that a
uniform conclusion follow from these premises. 76 Freedman explains that since we wish to allow certain latitude for each
individual's own value system, one we do not necessarily share, competency should be found and accepted if the premises are strong
enough to justify the conclusion.1" Accordingly, while we may disagree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the patient, if we are
willing to accept as rational reasons the arguments which support the
conclusion, and agree that these arguments are relevant, although we
would not necessarily find them decisive, the presumption of competence should be reaffirmed.'78 In that manner, we also neutralize the
criticism that, since the test establishes a line of demarcation between
acceptable or rational reasons and unacceptable reasons for action, it
is overly paternalistic.' Thus, under this test, an acceptable or rational reason becomes not what each and every member of society
would find decisive, but what a specific member would find relevant
enough to be included in the chain of reasoning leading to his decision. Should the patient's choice be contrary to objective standards of
rationality, the test requires that the patient's choice be at least subjectively critical and rational."s It has been explained that:
A patient need not conform to what most rational people do to be
considered competent, but the competent patient must be able to
give reasons for his decision. The patient must be able to show that
he has thought through the medical issues and related this information to his personal value system. The patient's personal reasons
need not be medically or publicly accepted, but neither can they be
purely private, idiosyncratic, or incoherent."'
Under the "Rational Reasons" test, a patient who chooses
premortem cryopreservation should not be declared incompetent simply because he has chosen a procedure that is unpopular with medical

176. See Freedman, supra note 133, at 64.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Drane. supra note, 133 at 927.
181.
Id.; see also Freedman, supra note 133, at 64 ("Since we wish to give latitude to
an individual's own value system, one which we do not necessarily share, it is not required
that the conclusion 'follow' from the premisses [sic], in that we believe the premisses [sic]
are strong enough to justify the conclusion.").
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professionals. As long as he has satisfactorily demonstrated his competence by evaluating all the necessary information and weighing all
the possible risks and benefits of his choice, the decision to undergo
premortem cryopreservation should be honored.
The proposed statutory amendment requires that at least two
physicians evaluate the patient and concur with the patient's diagnosis
and prognosis. The amendment assures that there is full disclosure of
all the necessary information. The next step would be for the patient
to weigh the risks and benefits of undergoing the procedure. In
premortem cryopreservation, the choice is between the occurrence of
natural death within a few months, on the one hand, and
cryopreservation with the possibility of future revival, on the other.
Should the patient decide that the possibility of an extended lifetime
in the future offered by cryopreservation outweighs the certainty of
more time in the present the patient should be found competent to
undergo the procedure.
One may argue that cryopreservation should be allowed only
after clinical death. The rationale for this argument would revolve
around the desire to give the patient an opportunity to benefit from
future advances in the art until the onset of natural death. However,
when one considers the physiological damage that certain diseases can
inflict on the body,' 2 the chances of successful revival are greater if
a subject is preserved premortem rather than postmortem.'83 Moreover, had there been a measurable chance that the patient's disease
would be cured in the foreseeable future and prior to the onset of
natural death, presumably, the patient would have opted against
premortem cryopreservation.
Freedman rationalizes that one way a person might fail to produce rational reasons for his choice is "by founding his argument
upon premisses [sic] known to be false."" For example, if it had
been conclusively proven that revival from cryopreservation cannot be
accomplished regardless of scientific advancement, if there were prov182. For example, according to the complaint filed with the Superior Court of California,
Donaldson suffered from a type of brain cancer that destroys the brain cells. See Plaintiff's
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and for an Injunction at 5, Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, No.
181830 (Cal. Super. Ct. of Santa Barbara, April 3, 1992).
183. See WOWK & DARWIN, supra note 3, at 10 ("[A] necessary requirement for the
success of cryonics is that the brain be preserved with reasonable integrity.")
184. Freedman, supra note 133, at 64. The other way in which a person might fail to
produce rational reasons for his choice, according to Freedman, is "by producing reasons
which, even if true and weighted heavily, fail to support the conclusion drawn, e.g., by refusing surgery because it's Tuesday." Id.
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en laws of the physical or biological sciences which demonstrated that
cryopreservation is theoretically and practically impossible to accomplish, then there would be no rational reason to undergo the procedure. Fortunately, that is not the case. Scientific evidence strongly
supports the conclusion that revival from cryopreservation will one
day be a reality.' 5
4. Ability to Understand and Actual Understanding
The "Ability to Understand" test reaffirms one's competency if
one is able to understand and act upon the relevant information provided by the physician." 6 The "Actual Understanding" test, on the
other hand, holds one competent if one actually does understand and
act upon the information.' Because of the logical nexus between
the two tests, it makes sense to analyze them together. Both tests
require that the patient be presented with the necessary information
upon which he will base his choice. In actual application, the "Ability
to Understand" test may well be the threshold issue in determining
the patient's "actual understanding" of the information provided. If
the patient must actually understand and act upon the information
presented in order to be found competent, then he must necessarily
have the ability to understand the information. Therefore, one who is
competent under one test must be competent under the other as
well.' 8
These two tests can be distinguished from the "Rational Reasons" test on the ground that the former do not require an evaluation
of the reasons for making a choice.' 9 The decision-making process
of the patient is supposedly not evaluated, since we wish to refrain
from questioning one's reasons for choosing one alternative as opposed to another.'" This argument seems curiously oxymoronic. In
addition to understanding the relevant information, the test requires
that the patient actually act upon it. This last requirement, arguably,
evaluates the decision-making process of the patient.
The question raised by these tests is whether one can knowingly
act upon information in irrational ways.' 9 ' If we answer in the affir-

185. See supra notes 109-29 and accompanying text.
186. Freedman, supra note 133, at 62.
187. Id. at 60.

188.

Id. at 62.

189.

Id.

190.

Id.

191.

Id. at 63.
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mative, yet uphold the decision reached, the tests will have failed to
carry out their stated purpose, namely to evaluate competency. Under
these circumstances, the tests would only be slightly ahead of the
"Evidencing a Choice" test. The only difference is that they would
implicate the patient's intellectual comprehension of the information,
while such a consideration is immaterial in the "Evidencing a Choice"
test. 2 On the other hand, if we agree that understanding the information and acting irrationally upon it are mutually exclusive, if the
rationality of the patient's choice serves as evidence of his level of
comprehension of the information, then we are once again applying
the "Rational Reasons" test,'93 while still maintaining the pretense
that because of our respect for individual autonomy we will not inquire into a patient's reasons for choosing one alternative over another.
In order to evaluate whether the patient understands and actually
acts upon the information, we must necessarily look at his choice.
Given that understanding information and using it rationally are practically inseparable,"9 if we accept his choice despite its unmistakable irrationality, then we are simply falling back on a slightly more
sophisticated version of the "Evidencing a Choice" test. Contrarily, if
we reject his choice because we consider it irrational and indicative
of a lack of comprehension, then we have decided competence by
applying the "Rational Reasons" test.
Essentially, the "Ability to Understand" and "Actual Understanding" tests define competence in terms of understanding information,
and understanding information in terms of competence. 5 That type
of circularity is fatal to any logical application of these tests.' To
adopt either the "Ability to Understand" test or the "Actual Understanding" test would give no independent scope to competence. Of
the five approaches used to measure competency, the one most applicable to the proposed amendment is the "Rational Reasons" test. It is
the only one which makes a valiant effort to evaluate competency
while still respecting individual autonomy.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B.

Countervailing State Interests

Generally, conduct does not enjoy immunity from governmental
interference simply because it is claimed to be an exercise of one's
right to autonomy. Indeed, Cruzan explains that a liberty interest,
although deserving of constitutional protection, is not afforded such

protection unless it passes muster in a balancing test against the relevant state interests."9 Broadening the scope of the right to autonomy or self-determination to encompass all situations where a person
wishes to achieve his own death would run counter to existing mores. 9 However, this Note prays for an extension of the right to
self-determination to include premortem cryopreservation. Courts
should examine premortem cryopreservation under the same analytical
framework established for the right to refuse treatment cases."'
This framework, which has evolved considerably over the years,
has its origin in In re President & Directors of Georgetown College2 and John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston."
197. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990). The
Cnizan Court further reasoned that the requirement that a patient's wish to refuse medical
treatment be proven by clear and convincing evidence embodies the countervailing interests of
the State of Missouri. Id. at 282; cf In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (NJ. 1985) ("On
balance, the right to self-determination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interests,
and competent persons generally are permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at the risk of
death. Most of the cases that have held otherwise, unless they involved the interest in protecting innocent third parties, have concerned the patient's competency to make a rational and
considered choice of treatment."). Taking these two cases together, one may conclude that
upon proof of a patient's competency by clear and convincing evidence, a patient's right to
determine his own health care will generally be upheld.
198. See Kadish, supra note 44, at 864. It is not difficult to understand the courts'
unwillingness to extend this right of autonomy to all cases in which the person wishes to
die. Extension of the right to nonmedical contexts would unearth formidable problems for the
law. Id. For example, if the right of automony was fully recognized, authorities would be
powerless to stop a perfectly healthy person from fatally shooting himself, even in a public
place. So long as he was competent when he arrived at the decision to kill himself, it would
be an exercise of his right to autonomy or self-determination.
199. See Note, supra note 10, at 2021 (advocating a similar calculus for cases of physician-assisted suicide).
200. 331 F.2d 1000, 1008-10 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (allowing
hospital to perform a blood transfusion on a non-consenting patient based on the reasoning
that the State has interests in (1) preventing suicide, (2) protecting innocent third parties, such
as the patient's minor children, from abandonment, and (3) protection of the medical
profession's desire to act affirmatively to save lives without fear of civil liability); see also
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977).
201.
279 A.2d 670 (NJ. 1971) (holding, based on facts similar to In re Georgetown
College, that the State's paramount interest in preserving life and the hospital's interest in
caring for its patient outweighed the patient's unwillingness to submit to a blood transfusion
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Since subordination of state interests to individual interests is not
universal, following a determination that the patient is competent,=
the court should balance the patient's right to autonomy against the

state's interests in:'
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

preserving life,
preventing suicide,
protecting innocent third parties,
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.'

1. Preserving Life
The state's interest in the preservation of life encompasses multi-

ple concerns: an interest in the sanctity of life, an interest in its value
to society as a whole, and an interest in prolonging the life of the
individual patient.' Premortem cryopreservation is consonant with
all these concerns. Premortem cryopreservation places a person afflicted with a presently incurable and terminal disease in a dormant state
until such time that his afflictions can be cured.' The goal of the
procedure is to revive the subject at a later time, apply the available
countermeasures to cure him, and allow him to lead a normal life.'
The procedure does not offend the state's interest in preserving life.
Indeed, the major purpose of the procedure is the preservation and
ultimate prolongation of human life. Hence, cryopreservation is actually a means of implementing the state's interest in preserving life.'
procedure).
202. In the case of a patient who personally decides to refuse treatment or undergo
cryopreservation, rather than through a surrogate decision-maker, the competence of the patient
is also a central issue. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225-26 (N.J. 1985) (commenting that cases in which the patient's right to refusal of treatment is overruled generally
question the competency of the patient to make a rational choice of treatment).
203. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
204. Id.; see also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. 1980).
205. See Note, supra note 10, at 2033; see also Matthews, supra note 18, at 729 &
nn.156-57.
206. McMullen & McMullen, supra note 127 (explaining that cryonics is the process of
freezing persons whose "death" has been caused by a disease uncorrectable by today's medicine, but which may be correctable in the future).
207. Id.
208. One state interest that may be upset by cryopreservation is the interest in not letting
property sit idly and unproductively. It is generally accepted that one of the purposes of real
property law in our capitalistic society is to assure the productive use of land. See, e.g.,
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY at xxi (1984). This principle of maximum economic efficiency promotes marketability. It also raises serious questions about the uses that can be
made of the property of a cryopreserved person. These questions can be especially troubling
if the subject has not left any directives on the use or disposal of the property.
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In the context of the right to refuse treatment, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has argued that allowing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is distinguishable from suicide:
[P]eople who refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may not harbor a specific intent to die, rather, they may fervently wish to
live
without protracted suffering ....
Recognizing the right of a terminally ill person to reject medical treatment respects that person's intent, not to die, but to suspend
medical intervention at a point consonant with the "individual's
view respecting a personally preferred manner of concluding
life. ' 9
Arguably, no one wishes to live more fervently than a person who,
when faced with an incurable and terminal disease, decides to under-

go cryopreservation until a cure for his afflictions is introduced. Some
may argue that because some time to the patient's life remains,
premortem cryopreservation should not be allowed. However, "[w]ho

shall say what the minimum amount of available life must be? Does
it matter... if such life has been physically destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose [are] gone?"2 ' Bouvia made clear that the
state's interest in the sanctity of life does not outweigh the diminished quality of life that the patient would experience.2 ' Moreover,

premortem cryopreservation, by trying to prolong life, glorifies the
sanctity of life.
2. Preventing Suicide
The state also has an interest in preventing suicide. '1 2 This

It may reasonably be assumed that the cryopreserved patient would want to resume
use and enjoyment of the property or the income therefrom upon revivification. However, the
economic underpinnings of property law may well determine the type of use or distribution
to which the property will be subjected while the patient awaits revivification. The subject
may attempt to structure the disposition of his property in a way which would guarantee him
some kind of reversionary residue upon revival; however, such tactics may implicate complex
issues dealing with the Rule Against Perpetuities. Notwithstanding their importance, these
issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
209. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985) (quoting Note, The Tragic Choice:
Termination of Care for Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 285,
310 (1976)).
210. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986).
211. Id. But see Cruzan v. Harmon. 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted, 492
U.S. 917 (1989), affd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990) (explaining that the state may refuse to consider quality of life as a factor).
212. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass.
1977).
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Note takes the view that suicide prevention runs parallel to the state's
interest in preserving life. While courts have often spoken of these
interests as independent, they are logically related. Preventing suicide
actually derives from the interest in preserving life. The underlying
policy is to avoid "irrational self-destruction. 2 3
Courts have reasoned that when death is inevitable and there is
no hope of cure or preservation of life, a decision to forego treatment
is not irrational self-destruction. 4 In the case of premortem
cryopreservation, the outcome amounts to the preservation of life; it
amounts to the preservation of the sanctity of life and its value to
society and to the preservation of the life of the patient. Accordingly,
the state's interest in preventing suicide is not compelling. Given the
narrow definition of suicide in the context of the right to refuse treatment,"' premortem cryopreservation does not rise to the level of
suicide. Suicide is defined as requiring a specific intent to take one's
own life.216 Such intent is lacking in cryopreservation. The intent in
cryopreservation is to eventually live free of disease and pain. Therefore, it is arguable that the interest in preventing suicide is not implicated in premortem cryopreservation of a competent, terminally ill
patient.
3. Protecting Innocent Third Parties
Another factor considered in deciding whether to allow a terminally ill patient to refuse medical treatment is the effect the death of
the patient may have on significant others.217 For example, if the
patient has dependent children, a court will consider the extent to
which the children will be deprived of the parent's financial and
emotional support.1

213. Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (Ct. App. 1984); Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
214. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11.
215. See, e.g., MICH. CoM'. LAwS ANN. § 752.1022(2)(f) (Supp. 1993) (defining suicide
or the voluntary self-termination of life as "conduct by which a person expresses the specific
intent to end, and attempts to cause the end of, his or her life"); see also In re Sponatski,
108 N.E. 466 (Mass. 1915), quoted in Hepner v. Department of Labor & Indus., 250 P. 461,
463 (Wash. 1926) (explaining that suicide is a "voluntary willful choice determined by a
moderately intelligent mental power which knows the purpose and the physical effect of the
suicidal actfl").
216. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1022(2)(f) (Supp. 1993); Hepner, 250 P.
at 462.
217. Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment:
Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228, 251-52 (1973).
218. See id. Presumably, the interest in protecting third parties is implicated only when
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It has been argued that the emotional aspect of the protection of
innocent third parties does not provide a solid foundation for state
intervention. 9 One can certainly conceive of situations where a
court's acquiescence with a patient's decision to forego life sustaining
treatment or undergo premortem cryopreservation would be emotionally uplifting to the patient's children.2' For example, the children
would not have to witness the physical and mental deterioration, and
eventual death of the parent. However, where the economic impact of
the parent's premortem cryopreservation would directly and substantially affect the children, the state's interest in protecting innocent
parties is implicated."
In weighing this interest, a court should remain cognizant of the
fact that premortem cryopreservation would be implemented only a
few months prior to natural death and after all other medical measures have proven ineffective. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that
the children's economic situation would be improved by requiring that
the patient live out the remaining months of her life. Indeed, it is
more probable that the children's economic situation will worsen. If
the parent is denied the opportunity to undergo premortem
cryopreservation, she will still need to undergo medical care. Even if
it is simply to alleviate the pain caused by the disease, it is not unusual for such ordinary care to exhaust a patient's entire life savings.
Moreover, the state's interest in the children's economic future is
furthered by allowing the estate of the cryopreserved subject to be
used to support the children; using the estate also satisfies the basic
principles of capitalism and real property law. m
Therefore, it may be more beneficial, both emotionally and economically, for the state to acquiesce to the wish of a competent,
terminally ill parent to undergo premortem cryopreservation. However,
this Note does not propose a mechanical application of some economic formula. This Note recognizes the formidable problems that a court
would face in attempting to evaluate the possible emotional benefit to
the children. Consequently, courts should adopt a case by case approach in weighing this important state interest; after all, the econom-

there are minor children involved. Cf. Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 n.6
(Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that the State's interest in protecting innocent third parties is not
implicated in the case at bar).
219. See Cantor, supra note 217, at 252.
220. See id.

221. Id. at 253.
222. See supra note 208.
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ic factors which would trigger this interest are not present in every
scenario.'
4. Maintaining the Integrity of the Medical Profession
"The most compelling principle of medical ethics always has
been beneficence: acting to benefit patients by sustaining life, treating
illness, and relieving pain." 4 The logical corollary to this principle
is the principle of nonmaleficence." It is just as compelling in

medical ethics for physicians to refrain from harming their patientsY 6 These two principles, however, can clash with a patient's
right to determine his own medical care.
Prior to the recognition of the right to refuse treatment, 7 medical professionals would often persist in continuing treatment, if only
to relieve the patient's pain, despite the obvious futility of the treat-

ment. Not surprisingly, "[s]ome physicians feel such an obligation to
sustain life that they consider withholding and withdrawing of life
support to be unethical in any form.""28 However, ethical standards
of the medical profession have changed considerably since the introduction of the Hippocratic Oath. 9 Today, a patient's recognized
decisional autonomy necessarily constricts the ethical duty and the
authority of physicians.' The modem ethical standards governing
the practice of medicine no longer require that treatment be main223. See Cantor, supra note 217, at 253.
224. John M. Luce, M.D., Ethical Principles in Critical Care, 263 JAMA 696 (1990). As
mandated by the Hippocratic Oath, a physician must follow that method of treatment which,
according to her ability and judgment, she considers to be for the greatest benefit of her
patients. Additionally, a physician must give "no deadly medicine . . . nor suggest any such
counsel." Goncaves v. Saab, 538 N.E.2d 142, 147 n.l (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (Pincham, J.,
dissenting) (quoting THE OATH OF HipPOCRATES).
225. Luce, supra note 224.
226. See Goncaves, 538 N.E.2d at 147 n.l.
227. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
228. Luce, supra note 224, at 698.
229. For example, after the introduction of cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") in the
1960s, most hospitals adopted policies that advocated CPR in all circumstances. Id. at 697.
Physicians often felt obligated to administer CPR whenever the situation called for it. Id.
However, they soon realized that not all patients wanted to be resuscitated, especially those
with terminal illnesses. Id. As a result, most hospital policies now allow CPR only after
acquiring the "informed consent [of] patients or surrogates." Id.
230. See Matthews, supra note 18, at 734. Prior to In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.
1976), for example, it would have been unthinkable for a physician to withhold or withdraw
life support from a patient, even at the latter's own insistence. Today, however, while some
physicians still consider withholding or withdrawing life support to be unethical, Luce, supra
note 224, at 698, "withholding and withdrawing of life support are entirely compatible with
the ethical principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and autonomy." Id.
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tained despite its glaring futility.' Moreover, the economic realities
of today simply do not permit the extension of care to the bitter
end. 2 In fact, continuing treatment when the competent patient has

rejected it invades the patient's right to self-determination, for "if the
doctrines of informed consent and right of privacy have as their foundations the right to bodily integrity and control of one's own fate,
then those rights are superior to the institutional considerations." 3
With the advent of cryopreservation techniques, a viable alternative will be available when medical technology is no longer capable
of helping the patient. Cryopreservation will not undermine the integ-

rity of the profession. In reality, this technology runs parallel with the
intent of the Hippocratic Oath. The goal is to benefit patients by
sustaining life through any means necessary. Preventing physicians
from using it would not satisfy any legitimate state interest, and
would vitiate the patient's right to privacy and self-determination.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Cryopreservation may well present certain problems that are
beyond the scope of this Note;'
however, its success in other
fields of the life sciences is a strong indication that cryobiologists
may not be too far from perfecting the technique. 5 Therefore, it
would be counterproductive for the legal system to ignore its acceptance or to try to label the procedure as suicide.

231. See Matthews, supra note 18, at 734.
232. Hospital personnel often complain of the shortage of health care professionals. Budget cuts, coupled with the shortage of health care workers, have forced physicians to triage
the critically ill. Critical care resources are carefully allocated so that they are not wasted on
patients whom they cannot help. See Luce, supra note 224, at 699.
233. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427
(Mass. 1977) (citations omitted).
234. Cryopreservation raises certain socio-economic issues that may impede its acceptance.
The high cost of the procedure may restrict its application only to the wealthy. Also, it is
conceivable that some people may try to triage patients to undergo the procedure. It may be
allowed only for the brightest intellectuals or for certain races; or the decision to allow the
procedure may be made based on the sexual orientation of the person. These are some of the
problems with which the legal system may have to wrestle, should the procedure become
widely accepted; however, they are not insurmountable and should not be the basis for stifling the progress of the technology. Society has always had to grapple with problems of
racism, homophobia, and abuses by, and favoritism of, the economic elite. Certain people
have always attempted to use scientific advancements for their own economic gain or to
satisfy their own hatred. For example, the Nazis conducted unspeakable experiments on Jews
in the name of science. However, fear of abuses have not decreased and should not decrease
the progress of science.
235. See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
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Contrary to the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal,
premortem cryopreservation should not be equated with suicide for a
number of reasons.' First, the rapid progress made in the fields of
cryobiology and nanotechnology places these fields on the verge of
proving that clinical death is not irreversible. Second, a cursory evaluation of the ultimate goal of premortem cryopreservation reveals the
illogic of equating the procedure with suicide. The competent, terminally ill patient who requests cryopreservation lacks suicidal intent.
The basic premise of the procedure is that death, as defined by our
legal system, is not invincible if a patient is properly cryopreserved.
The ultimate goal of the procedure is to extend life well beyond the
current figures for life expectancy. To that extent, premortem
cryopreservation is not different from other medical breakthroughs
that have the effect of prolonging life. Years ago, people were not
expected to live past their fortieth birthday. However, technological
advancements have contributed to a steady increase in life expectancy.
Similarly, cryopreservation has the potential to extend life almost
indefinitely. It seems ironic that the legal system would label as suicide a procedure which has as its main goal the prolongation of life.
Yet, as illogical as it may seem, the only alternative the law offers a
terminally ill patient is a painful and undignified death.
No legitimate state interest is served by preventing premortem
cryopreservation of a competent, terminally ill patient. The argument
that the procedure offends the state interests established in the context
of the right to refuse treatment 7 is illogical. The state, indubitably,
has an interest in preventing senseless self-destruction. However, to
the extent that premortem cryopreservation has the prolongation of
life at its very core, the state's interest in preventing suicide is not
implicated. On the other hand, the goal of premortem cryopreservation
supports the government's interest in preserving life. The state's interest in protecting innocent third parties, although important when it is
implicated, is only one of the factors to be considered by the court in
determining whether premortem cryopreservation should be allowed.
Lastly, the integrity of the medical profession would not be compromised by allowing premortem cryopreservation. Medical professionals
should view the procedure as another tool in their arsenal that helps
them to combat disease and prolong and protect life.
In the context of the right to refuse treatment, the United States

236. See Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Ct. App. 1992).
237. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has adopted the argument that the patient's decision to
refuse or terminate treatment must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. 8 The Court has, therefore, embraced the position espoused by some commentators, namely that the decision to deny or
uphold the right to direct one's own health care should be based on
the voluntary nature of the patient's decision, rather than the active/passive dichotomyY 9 Moreover, Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in Cruzan, unambiguously rejected the distinction between affirmative acts causing death and passive refusals of lifesaving treatment
which had, heretofore, enjoyed considerable judicial endorsement.' 4
Therefore, under Cruzan, the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to undergo premortem cryopreservation should also be upheld
when the individual's interests outweigh the countervailing state interests. The proposed amendment requires that the patient's decision to
undergo the procedure be made voluntarily and that the patient be
competent at the time the decision is reached.
The legal battlefield of premortem cryopreservation is too new to
have any well-defined standards. However, the proposed amendment
can be an effective first step in eliminating the chilling effect of the
law on premortem cryopreservation. The proscriptions against assisting
suicide can be amended so as to carve out an exception for the procedure. Well-reasoned legislative enactments can eliminate the potentials for abuse in the field of cryobiology, by allowing
cryopreservation only upon a showing that the patient is in fact terminally ill and is mentally competent to make an informed decision.
Velly B. Polycarpe*

238. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1989).
239. See, e.g., Beschle, supra note 18, at 331.
240. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296.
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comments on this Note. To Professor Eric M. Freedman and Professor John J. Regan, I
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by Ms. Patricia Kasting and Mr. Darren Green of the Hofstra Law School Library. I am
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of the Black Law Students Association, especially Anita Bowen, Vivianne Calizaire, Paige
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